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By
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I. INTRODUCTION
In speeches by Commissioners, articles by employees, briefs sub-
mitted in pending litigation, and responses to criticism, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed that the securi-
ties bar owes certain new duties of care and disclosure to the invest-
ing public.' The successful imposition upon attorneys of these res-
ponsibilities could change radically their traditional relationship to
corporate clients.2 The proposals have been justified as necessary
because the SEC has an inadequate budget and a limited staff for
regulation of the securities industry;3 however, the proposals have
been criticized as contrary to ethical standards, unauthorized by
statute and disruptive of future securities regulation.4
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Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School; Member, New York Bar. Ms. Karmel is a partner
in the law firm of Rogers & Wells in New York City.
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York Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission.
I See Garrett, Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws, Address to State Bar
of Texas, July 4, 1974; Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer,
[1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,631 [hereinafter cited as Sommer];
Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some
Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. Rav. 1 (1973). For an extended discussion of the impact of these
new duties see Proceedings, National Institute, American Bar Association, Responsibilities
and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAW. 1 (Special Issue: March 1975).
2 See Cooney, The SEC's Enforcement Theory, 30 Bus. LAw. 29 (Special Issue: March
1975); Corso, Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 375
(1968).
See In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404, [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,407 (1973); Loomis, P.L.I. SEcurriEs REGULATION TRAN-
scRiPT SERIES No. 3, at 255 (1972).
See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 437 (1975); Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An
Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUm. L. REV.
412 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels]; Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of
Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Corn-
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Except for a passing invocation to the general provisions of Rule
10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (Exchange Act)
and for references to subjective beliefs of early government officials
as to why the Securities Act of 19338 (Securities Act) and the Ex-
change Act were enacted, neither the source nor the limitations of
the new duties have been explained. This article will explore possi-
ble sources for SEC authority over the securities bar and the meth-
ods by which the SEC has exerted authority over attorneys. We will
argue that because government attorneys and private attorneys act
as adversaries, the SEC is not a proper agency to regulate the securi-
ties bar.
Although the bar's responsibility for the SEC's limited staff and
inadequate budget has never been explained, the SEC has resolved
to implement the new proposals not only by persuasive exhortation
but also by employing two enforcement techniques-injunctive and
disbarment proceedings.7 This article will consider the problems
which the new proposals present to attorneys who represent clients
in securities transactions and SEC investigations, with particular
emphasis upon the impact of the new proposals on representation
of a client during an SEC investigation. The lack of common law or
statutory bases for SEC regulation of attorneys as professionals in-
dicates that the new proposals involve the SEC and the courts in
the effort to impose on attorneys ambiguous standards which are
based upon parochial policy considerations. Further, because these
standards are not applied even-handedly to private and government
attorneys, they are unfair and corrosive of a free and adversary bar.
mission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERCER L. REv. 637 (1974); Sargent, The SEC and the Individ.
ual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REV. 553 (1974); Karmel,
Attorney's Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970). The Exchange Act has been extensively amended by
the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Public Law No. 94-29, approved June 4, 1975, most
of the provisions of which will not become effective until 180 days after enactment. The
citations herein do not take into account such amendments, unless specific reference to Public
Law No. 94-29 is made. See generally Rowen, Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 8 REV.
SEC. REG. No. 12 (June 27, 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
Garrett, Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws, Address to State Bar of
Texas, July 4, 1974. See also 30 Bus. LAW. at 153 (Special Issue: March 1975) (Summary of
criminal cases related to SEC matters where lawyers have been defendants); Sommer, supra
note 1.
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I. PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO ATTORNEYS' CONDUCT
A. Sources of Attorneys' Duties
1. Common Law
The novelty of the SEC's new proposals can be observed by con-
sidering the traditional sources by which attorneys' conduct has
been regulated. The privileges and responsibilities of an attorney to
his client or anyone else are grounded in the common law. In Eng-
land the legal profession regulated itself. The bar associations in the
United States also have played a role in regulating attorneys and
have acted as sifting agencies in determining the fitness of persons
to practice law.8 The canons of ethics of the bar associations rep-
resent a codification and interpretation of common law principles
applicable to attorneys' conduct.9 However, the primary regulator
of attorneys is the judiciary.
a. Malpractice
The relation between attorney and client is governed by the
common law of agency, inasmuch as the attorney is the client's
agent as well as a fiduciary'" occupying a position of trust and con-
fidence. The duty an attorney owes to his client allows the client to
sue for fraud or for breach of fiduciary duty and affords the attorney
no special defenses to such actions. In addition, attorneys are re-
sponsible for conduct which would subject them to malpractice
suits. Whether by a theory arising out of contractual obligation or
a breach of duty in tort to employ due care, an attorney may be
made liable to his client through malpractice suits for negligence in
any activities which manifest a lack of ordinary skill and diligence."
An attorney is generally not liable to third persons for negligence
in the performance of professional activities." The attorney's duty
extends only to his client or, in certain cases, to third party benefici-
See L. PATrERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 43-49 (1971).
See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1956).
20 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 67 (1937).
" See Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1963).
2 See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1187 (1972);
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 765 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Wade].
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aries who the attorney could foresee would rely on his conduct.'3
Further, the attorney is obligated to follow his client's instructions
unless the instructions are unlawful.' 4
Cases relating to malpractice construe the degree of care required
of an attorney as that exercised by the ordinary attorney. Accord-
ingly, attorneys are not liable even to their clients for errors of
judgment and are not generally held to the standard of a particular
attorney skilled in specialized fields. 5 Moreover, the attorney's lia-
bility for interpretation and application of statutes, regulations, and
cases extends only to such matters which are clear and unambi-
guous. 6 The attorney's liability in malpractice for damages arising
out of negligence has not been considered by state tribunals as being
coequal with standards for professional disbarment; that is to say,
attorneys guilty of malpractice are not, ipso facto, subject to disbar-
ment proceedings.
b. Duty to the Court
An attorney is an officer of the court and has a duty to the courts
and the public to assist in the proper and efficient administration
of justice. If a conflict arises between a lawyer's duty to his client
and the court, his duty to the court must prevail. 7 This duty in-
" See Wade, supra note 12; 82 U. PA. L. Ray. 876 (1934). But see Lucas v. Hanem, 56
Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). The
SEC's charges against attorneys in SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-72 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and SEC v. Everest Management
Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 5209 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) indicate a different view. For cases
limiting or extending accountants' duties to third parties see Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 97,781 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
- U.S. - (1975); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, [1973-74
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931).
" See Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 7 and Ethical Consideration 7-5
[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE Canon or ABA CODE EC]; Annot., 56 A.L.R. 962 (1928).
" See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1879); Note, Attorney Malpractice,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1294 (1963). See also Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509
(1951); Note, The Bases of the Attorney's Liability to His Client for Malpractice, 37 VA. L.
REV. 429 (1951); Wade, supra note 12, at 776.
"6 See Wade, supra note 12; cf. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (attorney's
limitations on technical matters).
" See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248
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cludes aiding the court in the dignified and orderly trial of cases,
refraining from entering into any engagement in which the attorney
has a personal interest, and devoting himself to his client with abil-
ity, skill, and diligence in accordance with professional ethics."8 The
court's power over attorneys for obstructing the administration of
justice is similar to the power to cite attorneys for contempt.19 An
attorney has no such special relationship to the legislative or execu-
tive branches of government.
It should be noted that the government lawyer, unlike other gov-
ernment employees, also owes a primary duty to the court rather
than to the agency or department for which he is employed and
which is his client. This means that the SEC staff attorney owes a
greater allegiance as an attorney to the court which admitted him
to practice than to the SEC.2"
In the context of the special relationship which an attorney has
to the courts, jurisdiction over the practice of law resided in the
state judiciaries which preceded the Constitution. The state courts
have an inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys as offi-
cers of the court. This power may be exercised over the admission,
suspension, discipline, and disbarment of attorneys as well as the
prevention of the unauthorized practice of law.2 Legislative action
with respect to the admission or disciplining of attorneys is in aid
of judicial power and does not supplant it.22 The power to determine
whether an attorney has committed an act for which he should be
suspended or disbarred is a judicial function which can be exercised
only by a court."s
N.Y. 465, 470-77, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928).
11 See State v. Barto, 202 Wis. 329, 232 N.W. 553 (1930); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §
4(a) (1937).
11 See In re Kelly, 243 F. 696, 705 (D. Mont. 1917). But courts do not have a summary
contempt power to disbar an attorney. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
21 See In re Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937); Poirier, The
Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541 (1974).
21 See In re Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937); Poirier, The
Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541 (1974). See also In re
Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill.
346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937).
" Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr.
228 (1966); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937); Mrotek v. Nair, 231 A.2d 95 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967).
n In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966); Brotsky
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There is no federal bar examination. However, the federal courts
as a coequal judiciary have the power to admit and discipline attor-
neys who practice before them.24 In so doing, the courts act pursuant
to federal rather than state law.25 Federal administrative agencies
such as the SEC have received no grant of judicial power to regulate
lawyers. Contrarily, they are prohibited by statute from establishing
substantive standards for licensing practitioners before them. 8 This
prohibition may be justified on the ground that such agencies are
creatures of the legislature whose actions are reviewable by the
courts. Although regulation is conducted by the courts, it rises to
the level of state action and is subject to the Due Process Clause and
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution."
Because administrative agencies are not courts, laymen may be
authorized to practice before them.28 However, representing clients
before an administrative agency may be deemed to be practicing
law and such conduct is subject to regulation by the judiciary.0 In
Emanuel Fields,30 an attorney who was subject to a disbarment
proceeding by the SEC argued that only the courts in the state in
which he was admitted may bar him from practice before the SEC.
The SEC rejected this contention and took an expansive view of its
own authority in stating that the SEC is
under a duty to hold our bar to appropriate rigorous stan-
dards of professional honor. To expect this vital function to
be performed entirely by overburdened state courts who have
v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962); In re Saddler, 35 Okla.
510, 130 P. 906 (1913). A court of limited jurisdiction, which has no power to admit attorneys
to practice before it, does not have the power to suspend or disbar. Mullen v. Confield, 105
F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
24 Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
2 See Cheatham, The Reach of Federal Action Over the Profession of Law, 18 STAN. L.
Rv. 1288 (1966).
2 Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952); 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1970).
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956). See also United Mine Work-
ers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
11 See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
21 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied,
302 U.S. 728 (1937).
31 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
79,407 (1973).
ATTORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITIES
little or no contact with the matters which which we deal
would be to shirk that duty31 (emphasis added).
It is questionable whether the SEC has a legally cognizable bar
or whether the SEC's solicitude for the work load of the state courts
is an adequate justification for the expansion of the Commission's
jurisdiction to regulate attorneys' conduct. Violation of the securi-
ties laws is ground for disbarment by the state courts and there are
numerous decisions involving these breaches as a basis for a discipli-
nary proceeding by the state judiciary. 2
c. Canons of Ethics
Historically the practice of attorneys who are members of the
American Bar Association has been regulated by the Canons of
Professional Ethics as amplified by specific reference to the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). These regulations have been
endorsed or adopted by state judicial committees, and attorneys,
upon admission, swear to abide by the Canons applied by their
particular court and bar. Although the Canons and CPR seek to
express comprehensive norms to guide attorneys' conduct in rela-
tionship to courts and clients, several Canons, Disciplinary Rules,
and Ethical Considerations have particular reference to attorneys'
conduct in representing clients in investigations under the securities
laws."
Canon 4 and its related rules require a lawyer, as agent, to pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of his client in a fashion which
extends beyond the attorney-client privilege. The justification for
such confidentiality is to encourage laymen to seek legal assistance
early and develop facts broadly enough to allow full representation.
The lawyer may not reveal such confidences or secrets to the client's
disadvantage or a third party's advantage unless with the client's
full consent, when required by law or court order, when necessary
beyond a reasonable doubt to prevent a crime by the client, or when
11 Id. at.83,174 n.21.
" Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1408 (1968).
" Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Discliplinary Rules have been accepted by the
states and provide general guidance to securities problems for lawyers. See Panel Discussion,
Responsibility of Lawyers Advising Management, 30 Bus. LAW. 13, 14 (Special Issue: March
1975).
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involved in a bona fide dispute with the client. 4 By contrast the
SEC has argued that attorneys can be charged with fraud if they
fail to notify the Commission of information which arose from con-
fidences from their client. 5
An attorney has a duty to exercise independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of a client under Canon 5, which has been inter-
preted to mean that the lawyer for a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with
the entity. Dual representation of the entity and such individuals
is permitted only after full disclosure to both and only when the
lawyer is convinced that differing interests are not present. 6 In exer-
cising independent professional judgment, neither the interests nor
desires of third parties, including legislatures or administrative
agencies, should dilute an attorney's principal allegiance to his
client. The SEC contends, however, that a corporation attorney's
real clients are the stockholders, so that disclosure of confidential
information to the public and to the SEC for the benefit of stock-
holders is only disclosure to the client. 31
Canon 7 urges a lawyer to represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law. One related Ethical Consideration suggests that
in uncertain areas the lawyer's zeal may be affected depending on
whether the lawyer is an adviser or an advocate for the client. This
distinction is stated in relation to the facts and actions of the client
which are considered by the lawyer; an adviser primarily deals with
advice on a future course of conduct; the advocate deals with the
effects of past conduct.38 Administrative agencies like the SEC are
11 ABA CODE DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101 [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE DR]; ABA
COMM. ON ETics AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 335 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as ABA OPINIONS].
1 See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974); Practising Law Institute on Securities Regulation (R.
Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., John D. Shipper ed. 1973) 187, 224, 233 [hereinafter cited as
PLI Fourth Institute].
3 ABA CODE EC 5-18, 5-19.
3 See Lowenfels, supra note 4; Sommer, supra note 1; PLI Fourth Institute, supra note
35, at 231-37.
3 ABA CODE EC 7-3. Such a distinction may provide no practical solution. See Jennings,
The Corporate Lawyer's Responsibilities and Liabilities in Pending Legal Opinions, 30 Bus.
LAW. 73, 74-75 (Special Issue: March 1975).
754
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recognized in the Ethical Considerations not as tribunals but as
legislative or quasi-judicial bodies .3 For this reason, the attorney
appearing before the SEC owes the same duty to both the legal
system and his client: to advance the cause of his client as an advo-
cate.4" The bounds of the lawyer's zeal are restricted by responsive
duties in that he shall not knowingly use perjured or false evidence
and shall not state facts falsely. 41 However, he has no duty to volun-
teer information which would affect his client's cause adversely.
Affirmative duties to disclose a client's civil fraud are imposed
only in very limited circumstances:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected
as a privileged communication.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud
upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tri-
bunal."
This rule requires that the fraud, presumably common-law fraud,
be clearly established, that it occur during the course of rep-
resentation, and that the lawyer first call on the client to rectify
it. 3 Thereafter the lawyer's affirmative duty is to reveal the fraud
to the tribunal or to the person affected. Under the Canons, the SEC
is not recognized as a tribunal except when acting as an adjudica-
tory body.44 The SEC staff, however, may believe, and commenta-
' ABA CODE DR 7-102(B); ABA CODE EC 7-15. See Definitions appended to CPR.
"ABA CODE EC 7-19.
' ABA CODE DR 7-102(A).
4 ABA CODE DR 7-102(B). The affirmative duties imposed by the Rule appear to arise
during the course of representation and not during the course of the fraud. Efforts to impose
an affirmative duty for fraud which occurred prior to representation when the fraud may be
"continuing" suggest additional problems. See PLI Fourth Institute, supra note 35, at 232-
37. Hopefully, even after discharge of the affirmative duty, the client is still entitled to full
right to counsel.
13 To meet statutory frauds in the development of the securities law under Rule 10b-5,
it has been suggested that the affirmative duty of the lawyer may be coequal with expanded
disclosure. See Panel Discussion, Responsibility of Lawyers Advising Management, 30 Bus.
LAW. 13, 23 (Special Issue: March 1975).
11 See 30 Bus. LAW. 25 (Special Issue: March 1975). As to the questionable standing of
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tors have assumed, that it is a tribunal to whom attorneys must
reveal their client's fraud. An affected person, even under Rule 10b-
5, may be the purchaser or seller who was a party to the fraud, but
not the SEC. Moreover, during SEC investigations where fraud is
not clearly established, the corporate lawyer should function as an
advocate who represents an adversary point of view. Where his
client's case is arguable he should be under no more obligation to
disclose its weakness, factual or legal, to the SEC as an affected
person than he would be to make such disclosure to an opposing
lawyer."
The tension between the duty to preserve a client's confidences
and the duty to disclose fraud was discussed in a recent Bar Associa-
tion Committee Report which concluded that the Canons "would
appear to mandate disclosure by a lawyer of his client's material
representations or omissions only in those instances where the mis-
statement or omission clearly constitutes fraud under the securities
laws and the lawyer knows it." Further, the Report seriously ques-
tioned whether the SEC is a tribunal to which a duty to disclose
fraud is owed, except for fraud perpetrated upon the tribunal in an
adjudicatory proceeding."
The Canons and their related interpretations assure clients a
maximum defense unless and until the attorney is certain that his
client is engaging in illegal conduct or that his client has made false
statements. Logically, the duty to defend a client arises from the
first contact with the SEC when the attorney begins his representa-
tion of the client and perceives the adversary threat to his client."
The disagreement between the SEC and the private bar was high-
lighted by a Statement of Policy on Lawyers' Responsibilities and
Liabilities when Advising with Respect to Laws Administered by
the SEC adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
the SEC to prevent crimes, see 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970), requiring prosecution by the
Department of Justice. As to the obligation to disclose a communication of a crime, see DR
4-101(B)(3); ABA OPINIONs No. 155, 314.
" EC 7-15 states "A lawyer appearing before an administrative agency, regardless of the
nature of the proceeding it is conducting, has the continuing duty to advance the cause of
his client within the bounds of law." This EC cites ABA OPNION No. 314 (1965): "But as an
advocate before a service which itself represents the adversary point of view, where his client's
case is fairly arguable a lawyer is under no duty to disclose its weaknesses, any more than he
would be to make such a 'disclosure to a brother lawyer.'"
,1 The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged
in Securities Law Practice-A Report by the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and
Liability, 30 Bus. LAw. 1289, 1298-99, 1301 (July 1975).
11 Freeman, Legal Ethics, N.Y.L.J. (April 24, 1974).
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Association on August 12, 1975. The Statement of Policy stresses
that the "confidentiality of lawyer-client consultations and advice
and the fiduciary loyalty of the lawyer to the client. . . are vital to
the basic function of lawyer as legal counselor." Further, the State-
ment of Policy squarely rejects the "general principle that lawyers
must inform the SEC or others regarding confidential information"
received from clients because "such compelled disclosure would se-
riously and adversely affect the lawyers' function as counselor, and
may seriously and adversely affect the ability of lawyers as advo-
cates to represent and defend their clients' interests." In addition
to contesting the idea that a lawyer can be regarded by a govern-
ment agency as a source of information concerning possible wrong-
doing by clients, the Statement of Policy suggests that when a law-
yer considers whether his client's conduct establishes the prospec-
tive commission of a crime or perpetration of a fraud, the lawyer is
not required to uncritically accept the SEC's interpretation of the
law. "The client's actions should not be improperly narrowed
through the insistence of an attorney who may, perhaps uncon-
sciously, eliminate available choices from consideration because of
his possible personal risks if the position is taken which, though
supportable, is subject to uncertainty or contrary to a known, but
perhaps erroneous, position of the SEC or a questionable lower court
decision."
The Canons have been applied by the SEC as standards for the
conduct of attorneys in its proceedings under Rule 2(e) of the SEC's
Rules of Practice." However, unless the CPR has been specifically
adopted by a court, the court is not bound to apply it, but may use
it as an aid to determining acceptable practice.49 The judiciary has
inherent supervisory power over attorneys, and when a bar associa-
tion acts to discipline an attorney it is functioning as an arm of the
court and not independently." In so acting, the self-regulatory bar
associations may not impair the independence of the bar.
A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy
objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in
order to obtain that goal. It is also important both to society
and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to
think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar."
From time to time the suggestion is made that the adversarial
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974).
" Handelman v. Weiss, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,214,
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962).
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ideal of the legal profession be made subservient to some other ideal,
such as the search for truth. The SEC's present enforcement pro-
gram against attorneys is essentially an effort to impose upon the
securities bar a duty to pursue truth at the expense of adversary
defense. As an eminent jurist has pointed out, however, the CPR
does not contain a Canon on either "Duty to the Truth," or "Duty
to the Community. '52
2. Securities Laws
Although attorneys are subject to the same responsibilities and
duties as other persons when acting in the capacity of officers, direc-
tors, stockholders, experts or, where qualified, accountants, the se-
curities laws impose few special duties or responsibilities on
attorneys, as attorneys. 3 Legislative history and the provisions of
Schedule A of the Securities Act support the proposition that the
Congress declined to recognize or impose any special duties on attor-
neys to the investing public in regard to registration of securities.
In contrast, Section 19 of the Securities Act expressly authorized the
SEC to implement regulations of substantive effect in the field of
accounting and Schedule A imposed duties upon experts, as ex-
perts, in regard to designated portions of a prospectus. 4
52 See Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal View, 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
14, 34 (1975). Judge Frankel's Address also appears in 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975), and is
then criticized by two authors who argue that the adversary system is fundamental to a free
society. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975); Uviller,
The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1067 (1975).
- See Sommer, Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get Here, 30 Bus. LAW. 100
(Special Issue: March 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 77aa (Schedule A) (1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970) which provides in
pertinent part:
Among other things, the Commission shall have authority, for the purposes of this
subchapter, to prescribe the form or forms in which required information shall be
set forth, the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and earning state-
ment, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts, in the ap-
praisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation
and depletion, in the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the
differentiation of investment and operating income, and in the preparation, where
the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of consolidated balance sheets or
income accounts of any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the
issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer; but
insofar as they relate to any common carrier subject to the provisions of section 20
of Title 49, the rules and regulations of the Commission with respect to accounts
shall not be inconsistent with the requirements imposed by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission under authority of such section. The rules and regulations of the
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The power of the SEC to promulgate accounting standards has
been generally exercised. Nevertheless, the distinction between
imposing affirmative duties of detached objectivity upon accoun-
tants and recognition of some separate and pre-existing responsi-
bility of attorneys in SEC practice is recognized in American Fi-
nance Company, Inc.,55 where the SEC stated:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting
as the client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters
into a personal relationship in which his principal concern is
with the interests and rights of his client. This requirement of
the Act of certification by an independent accountant, on the
other hand, is intended to secure for the benefit of public inves-
tors the detached objectivity of a disinterested person. The
certifying accountant must be one who is in no way connected
with the business or its management and who does not have
any relationship that might affect the independence which at
times may require him to voice public criticisms of his client's
accounting practices.5"
Although the SEC mentions that in addition to the paramount
duty to his client an attorney owes a "public responsibility," the
sources or limitations of such responsibility, if different from com-
mon law or judicial precedent, are not articulated. The American
Finance opinion does not distinguish between an attorney's public
responsibility and the public responsibility of all persons. In cases
imposing on directors subjective standards such as knowledge and
understanding or ability to ask meaningful questions, the fact that
a director is an attorney has been taken into account in determining
whether the director exercised and discharged his duty of due
diligence .5 But aside from participation as an expert passing on the
legality of the security's issuance, there is no requirement to name
counsel in a registration statement and, presumably, neither the
role nor the identity of counsel was deemed material by Congress
in the context of Schedule A of the Securities Act.
Although Section 19(a) of the Securities Act also confers author-
ity upon the SEC to define other persons whose professions confer
Commission shall be effective upon publication in the manner which the Commis-
sion shall prescribe.
40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962).
Id. at 1049.
', See Escott v. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re Spater, N.Y.L.J. (April
25, 1974); Panel Discussion, Lawyers As Directors, 30 Bus. LAw. 41, 45 (Special Issue: March
1975); Cheek, Counsel Named In A Prospectus, 6 SEc. L. REv. 203 (1973); Folk, Civil Liabili-
ties Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
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special authority to statements in a prospectus, the SEC has never
included attorneys within such definition except with respect to
narrowly confined expertise relating to the legality of the issuance
of a security. Accordingly, the requirements of Section 11 with re-
spect to statements contained in a prospectus on the authority of
an attorney, as an attorney, would be confined to statements of ex-
pertise relating to legality of the issuance of the securities, special
litigation, or specific legal questions such as tax, international law,
patent law or property law." If the SEC has made its forms so
complicated that clients must turn to attorneys to prepare these
forms, this should not extend the liability imposed on attorneys who
undertake the task.
There is no requirement in the Exchange Act nor in its related
forms to identify or name counsel with respect to his activities in
the preparation of required reports or related forms under that Act
unless the attorney has a material relationship with the issuer in
addition to serving as an attorney.59
The Public Utility Holding Company Act" and its regulations.
contain no mention of special duties for attorneys. The Trust Inden-
ture Act, however, contains a provision which requires qualified
indentures to include an opinion of counsel on the recording and
filing which is necessary to make and maintain an effective lien and
to comply with conditions precedent to the operation of the inden-
ture." The regulations adopted pursuant to the Trust Indenture Act
contain neither standards nor forms to guide the attorney in the
preparation or issuance of these required opinions.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains no special require-
ments for attorneys which distinguish them from other persons.2
Similarly, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 imposes no special
duties upon attorneys, but, in its definition of investment adviser,
provides at exemption for any attorney whose performance of advi-
sory services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession. 3
11 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 230.435-7 (1974); see also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5051 (1970).
51 For examples, see proxy rules 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3, Regulation 14A, Item 7; Form 10,
Item 9.
15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq. (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80(a) et seq. (1970). See, however, the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(2)
(19)(vi) (1970) on the definition of "interested persons" and the interpretation by the SEC
in Alpha Investors Fund Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. Sac. L. REP. 78,618
(1971), that a lawyer is an interested person ineligible to serve as a disinterested director.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11)(B) (1970).
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Under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), 4 the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a non-profit
membership corporation, selects a trustee for the bankrupt broker-
dealer and an attorney to the trustee.65 However, once the trustee
and his attorney are appointed, they become officers of the court
like any other bankruptcy trustee or attorney.6 Neither SIPC nor
the SEC determines whether the attorney who has been selected is
sufficiently "disinterested" to serve in the proceedings, 7 or what
compensation the attorney may receive."8 These are matters of judi-
cial prerogative. Similarly, any ethical questions which may arise
in the course of the proceeding with regard to the conduct of any
attorneys for any of the parties may be decided by the court under
its general supervisory powers. 9
Where the SEC participates as a party under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, it does not have any direct authority over the
attorneys for other parties. Although the SEC may make recom-
mendations as to fees to be awarded to attorneys, and its recommen-
dations may be given great weight, the determination as to such fees
is a judicial function.70 If the SEC believes an attorney is not "disin-
terested" it may so argue before the court like any other party, but
the SEC has no power either to disqualify the attorney or to take
disciplinary action against him.7"
The latest draft of the codification of all federal securities laws
similarly does not increase attorneys' liabilities.7 The legislation
64 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as SIPA]. SIPA is a putative
amendment to the Exchange Act, SIPA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78bbb, and provides a procedure for
liquidating broker-dealers which have failed financially. Although SIPA is primarily a
bankruptcy law, incorporating by reference various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,
SIPA § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(1), the SEC has rulemaking and other authority under
the statute. SIPA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg.
11 SIPA § 5(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3) (1970). SIPC plays a role under SIPA vis-a-
vis the SEC similar to the role played by the national securities exchanges under the Ex-
change Act.
es Guttman, Broker-Dealer Bankruptcies, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 887, 934 (1973).
67 SIPC v. Schreiber Bosse & Co., Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 94,461 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
SIPC v. Charisma Securities Corp., 506 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1974).
' Handelman v. Weiss, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,214
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1o See In re Imperial "400" National, Inc., 432 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1970). In an equity
receivership obtained upon application by the SEC, the court similarly limited SEC author-
ity. See SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,187 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
7, See Commonwealth Fin'l Corp., Civ. Action No. 30108 (E.D. Pa.), described in SEC,
35th Annual Report 160 (1969).
7 See Loss, Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAW. 163, 166 (Special Issue: March 1975).
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enacted as the Securities Reform Act of 1975 and the statements of
the SEC in support of the components of this legislation contain no
reference to imposing specific statutory duties on attorneys."
For these reasons, the source as well as the application of the new
proposals on attorneys' duties must be found not in the statutes or
regulations but in SEC policy considerations or in staff conclusions
based on investigations.
3. Rules of Practice
In its Rules of Practice the SEC has adopted, pursuant to its
general rule-making authority, general provisions relating to pro-
ceedings before the SEC, particularly those which involve adjudica-
tory hearings.74 Most of the Rules have application only according
to their intended scope. Rules 5 through 25 relate to administrative
procedures. Rule 2(e) 75 contains express provisions for suspension
73 See note 5, supra.
74 17 C.F.R. § 201.1 et seq. (1974).
75 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974). Rule 2(e) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the viola-
tion of any provision of the federal securities laws ....
(2) An attorney who has been suspended or disbarred by a Court.. . or any
person who has been convicted of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, shall be forthwith suspended from appearing or practicing before the
Commission ....
(ii) Any person temporarily suspended from appearing and practicing before
the Commission in accordance with paragraph (i) may, within thirty days after
service upon him of the order of temporary suspension, petition the Commission to
lift the temporary suspension. If no petition has been received by the Commission
within thirty days after service of the order by Mail the suspension shall become
permanent.
(3)(i) The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and without
preliminiy hearing, may by order temporarily suspend from appearing or practic-
ing before it any attorney, . . . who, on or after July 1, 1971, has been by name
(A) permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction
by reason of his misconduct in an action brought by the Commission
from violation or aiding and abetting the violation of any provision of
the federal securities laws . . . ; or
(B) found by any court of competent jurisdiction in an action
brought by the Commission to which he is a party or found by this
Commission in any administrative proceeding to which he is a party
to have violated or aided and abetted the violation of any provision
of the federal securities laws. . . or of the rules and regulations there-
under (unless the violation was found not to have been wilful). ...
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and disbarment of any person, whether lawyer or non-lawyer, al-
though historically the SEC has applied it only to attorneys and
accountants.
The constitutionality of Rule 2(e) has not been adequately tested
in the courts, and the Rule is subject to attack on a number of
grounds. The SEC does not have either an inherent contempt
power78 or an inherent power over attorneys who practice before the
agency,77 but has only that limited power to discipline attorneys
which may be essential to the exercise of its other powers.78 To the
extent that the SEC has tried to use Rule 2(e) to set substantive
standards for the practice of law, 79 it has acted in contravention of
federal law." To the extent that Rule 2(e) gives the SEC summary
power to discipline attorneys, more serious questions as to the con-
stitutional validity of the Rule are raised." To the extent that the
SEC may disbar an attorney without proving "wilful" misconduct, 2
the SEC is subjecting attorneys to a different and higher standard
of conduct than persons directly subject to SEC regulation. 3
The SEC has utilized Rule 2(e) in an attempt to interpret "prac-
ticing before the Commission" to encompass the practice of securi-
ties law as a specialty. Rule 2(g) of the SEC's Rules of Practice
defines the term "practicing before the Commission" to include:
11 See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 145-46 infra and accompanying text.
7s See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873).
7' See, e.g., Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1970). See notes 141-58 infra and accompanying text.
See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873). The SEC contends that practice before the
agency is a privilege, rather than a right. See Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of
Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Com-
mission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERCER L. REv. 637, 646-47 (1974). This contention is very
questionable and cannot justify summary disciplinary proceedings. See Willner v. Committee
on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). To the extent that the right to counsel in the
Sixth Amendment was an inherent condition to ratifying the Constitution, any infringement
on that right by the SEC, a creature of congressional power over interstate commerce, is
historically and constitutionally troublesome.
52 See Rule 2(e)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535
(2d Cir. 1973).
" See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1970). See
notes 124-26 infra and accompanying text.
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(1) transacting any business with the Commission; and
(2) the preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper
by any attorney, . . or other expert, filed with the Commis-
sion in any registration statement, notification, application,
report or other document with the consent of such . . . ex-
pert. 8
However, in SEC v. Ezrine,n this definition was extended to in-
clude:
Representing or advising, in connection with any matter aris-
ing under or related to the federal securities laws or the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder, any broker or dealer
in securities, national securities exchange, investment com-
pany, investment adviser, or public utility holding company,
registered or required to be registered with the Commission,
except where such representation or advice directly relates to
the conduct of litigation in the courts of the United States or
of any state or to a proceeding or investigation being conducted
by or before any governmental department or agency other
than the Commission; and
Rendering formal or informal advice to any person, whether in
the form of a written opinion of counsel or otherwise, express-
ing an opinion with respect to the legality of any act, transac-
tion, practice or course of conduct under, the nature of any
duty, obligation or liability imposed by, or the interpretation
of, any provision of the federal securities laws or the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder . 8
In the Ezrine case, an attorney had been automatically suspended
from practice before the SEC as the result of having been enjoined
in one securities fraud case and convicted of a felony in another
case. Instead of contesting the Rule 2(e) proceeding, the attorney
sent a letter to the Commission purporting to resign from practice.
He nevertheless continued to represent clients before the Commis-
sion, including in, an adjudicatory proceeding. The SEC then insti-
tuted an injunctive action to enjoin him from further violations of
Rule 2(e). A preliminary injunction was obtained on the basis of the
SEC's "undisputed allegations";87 a permanent injunction was ob-
4 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1974).
13 [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FEo. SEC. L. REP. 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
u Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction, Civ. Action No. 3161 (June 11, 1974).
" Order of Preliminary Injunction, 72 Civ. Action No. 3161 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3,1972). The
ATTORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITIES
tained on consent. Although obtaining an expanded definition of the
concept of practicing securities laws was not necessary to the en-
forcement objectives of the particular case, the Commission seized
the opportunity to try to expand its jurisdiction over attorneys.
To the extent that the Commission is attempting to exercise au-
thority over the rendering of advice under the federal securities
laws, whether in connection with a proceeding, investigation or
conference, or document filed at the SEC, the Commission would
appear to be usurping a judicial prerogative.
B. Fallacious Distinctions
The SEC's notion that an attorney has a responsibility to the
Commission and the investing public greater than the attorney's
responsibility to his client rests upon a number of fallacious as-
sumptions and distinctions.
1. Adversary or Advisory
One of the most significant of the SEC's erroneous premises is
that its relation to the securities bar is that of a court instead of an
adversary. The SEC has tried to rationalize a compulsion for attor-
neys to come forward with evidence of corporate fraud by drawing
a distinction between an attorney's advisory and adversarial roles."
The SEC has suggested that attorneys for corporate clients in the
disclosure process or in considering exemptions serve in an advisory
capacity and have a responsibility to the public investor," and only
in litigation do attorneys serve as adversary to the SEC. Accord-
ingly, only then are they entitled to avail themselves of all legiti-
mate means to protect the interests of the corporate client. This is
SEC was required to go to court because it does not have inherent power to discipline
attorneys.
" Commissioner Sommer has stated:
There is a difference between an adviser and an advocate. An advocate deals with
the past and he deals with the past conduct of his client when that conduct is
questioned in court. On the other hand the lawyer is serving as an advisor in looking
to the future.
Sommer, Lawyers-Where Does Responsibility Fall in Cases of Private Placement? CoM. &
FIN'L CHRON. 7 (July 8, 1974).
" See Sommer, supra note 1.
'o See Garrett, Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws, Address to State Bar
of Texas, July 4, 1974.
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a distinction without a difference in a situation where an attorney
is representing a client at any stage before a governmental agency
which acts as a legislator, prosecutor and judge."
An attorney who advises a client respecting a registration state-
ment must consider the possibilities of a "stop-order"9 proceeding.
An attorney who requests a "no-action" letter must consider the
consequences of failing to obtain a letter.9 3 The attorney who re-
quests an exemptive order under the Investment Company Act 4 or
any other statute must consider what alternatives are open to a
client if the order is not forthcoming. Each of these representations
involves as adversarial a posture as that of an attorney representing
a witness who has been subpoenaed to testify in an SEC investiga-
tion. The attorney has a duty to obtain the best possible result for
his client, not to assist the SEC in the general administration of the
federal securities laws.9
The SEC may choose to regulate the securities industry by pro-
mulgating new rules or novel legal theories. A client should be en-
titled to adversarial review of such regulation by a private attorney.
The securities bar should not be compelled, under threat of prosecu-
tion, to advise clients based upon what the SEC says the law is, as
" See B. SCHWARTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1962);
cf. Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC, 25
MERCER L. REV. 637, 642 (1974). The Ash Commission pointed out that although the SEC
exercised judicial functions, its "authority most resembles that of a prosecutor" and further,
there was a conflict between the agency's adjudicatory role and its "responsibilities to prose-
cute and formulate policy." President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization 101, 104
(1971).
92 A stop order issued pursuant to the Securities Act § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970),
suspends the -effectiveness of a registration statement. A stop order proceeding is adjudicatory
and adversary. However, an order declaring a registration statement effective is also adjudica-
tory and should not be considered non-adversary merely because it is agreed to by the issuer
registrant.
"1 The adversary nature of a "no-action" request was recognized in Potomac Federal
Corp. v. SEC. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,704, dismissed on other
grounds, 94,815 (D.D.C. 1974).
1, The difference between the functioning of a court and the functioning of the SEC in
granting an exemption under the Investment Company Act was discussed in Contran Corp.,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,105 (Dec. 24, 1974).
Is In the SEC investigation, the SEC and not the client decides whether to litigate, so
an adversary relationship must be assumed at the moment of first meeting the SEC. But see
Jennings, The Corporate Lawyer's Responsibilities and Liabilities in Pending Legal Opinions,
30 Bus. LAW. 73 (Special Issue: March 1975).
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opposed to what a lawyer in good faith believes a court may say the
law is."
The adversarial role of counsel should not depend upon whether
a client is being represented with respect to developing current facts
or historical facts. Today's elusive reality is tomorrow's trial record.
In dealing with the Government, a client has the right to undivided
loyalty from his lawyer from the outset of a retainer.97
2. Enforcement or Processing
The SEC's staff is presently divided into various divisions. In its
present organization a distinction is drawn between divisions which
are engaged in regulatory functions and divisions which are engaged
in enforcement functions. Although these divisions may have a valid
administrative basis, there is nothing sacrosanct about them. The
responsibilities now handled by the Division of Enforcement and
the Division of Market Regulation were once handled by the single
Division of Trading and Markets. 8
The SEC staff is attempting to impose on the securities bar gener-
ally its own internal administrative divisions. It is positing the view
that attorneys' work can be divided into either enforcement and
litigation or interpretation and processing. The business world in
which the attorney or his corporate client operates, however, is not
similarly divided into neat bureaucratic compartments. The SEC is
not entitled to restructure the multifarious securities industry and
1 Compare Sommer, supra note 1 and Shipman, The Need For SEC Rules to Govern
the Duties and Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231
(1973) with SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). The reappraisal suggested
as to modern roles of an advisor or advocate depends on the client's approach, not the SEC's
subsequent view. The role of the private practitioner in curtailing an abuse of authority by a
regulatory agency in the agency's interpretation of its powers is extremely important and
should be protected. See Smith v. FTC, SRLR No. 296, A-11 (D. Del. 1975) (involving a
proper and successful attack on FTC's line of business reporting program).
11 The SEC's contention that the securities lawyer should not be allowed to look for
loopholes like the tax lawyer is improper. An attorney is permitted to show his client how to
avail himself fully of business opportunities permitted by law. EC 7-1, 7-2, 7-4. See Johnson,
The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC, 25 MERCER L. REV.
637, 661 (1974); Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 412, 418 (1953).
See also Harper, To Cooperate With the Service or Not? Obligations and Rights of the
Practitioner, J. TAX. 220 (April 1975).
11 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5289 (1972). See PLI, The SEC Speaks Again, 99-100,
161 (1973).
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the multidisciplinary bar to suit its own administrative conveni-
ence.
Just as there is no real difference between the roles of the staff
attorney and the private practitioner in processing work or SEC
investigations, there is little difference between investigations and
prosecutions. Although there is a significant distinction between a
formal order of investigation and an order for administrative pro-
ceedings, in the vast majority of cases the function of the staff
attorney conducting the investigation is to obtain the evidence nec-
essary for prosecuting a case.
3. Management or Stockholders
Two SEC Commissioners recently have defined the corporation to
be its shareholders. Commissioner Sommer has expressed the view
that a suggested dichotomy between the shareholders and the corpo-
ration is "absurd." "As if the corporation is distinguishable from the
shareholders. Perhaps the management is, perhaps the directors
are, but far more truly than either of those groups the shareholders
are the corporation."9
Commissioner Pollack, in the course of a panel discussion on pro-
fessional responsibility, stated that a lawyer's clients are the corpo-
ration and the public, not incumbent management."" This view of
the corporation attorney's client as (present and future) stockhold-
ers is both unrealistic and legally invalid.
The CPR provides for representation of the corporate entity,
which means neither its stockholders nor its officers.'0 ' In Garner v.
Wolfinbarger,0 2 communications between a corporation attorney
and officers of the corporation were held not to be privileged in a
derivative stockholders suit. The court viewed the engagement of
counsel as being for the benefit of the stockholders, stating:
Corporate management must manage. It has the duty to do so
" Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson In Corporate Responsibility, Address to Law
Advisory Council, Notre fIame University, reprinted in [1974-75"Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,010 (1974).
, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 277, A-9 (Nov. 13, 1974).
,01 ABA CODE EC 5-18.
102 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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and requires the tools to do so. Part of the managerial task is
to seek legal counsel when desirable, and, obviously, manage-
ment prefers that it confer with counsel without the risk of
having the communications revealed at the instance of one or
more dissatisfied stockholders. The managerial preference is a
rational one, because it is difficult to envision the management
of any sizeable corporation pleasing all of its stockholders all
of the time, and management desires protection from those
who might second-guess or even harass in matters purely of
judgment.
But in assessing management assertions of injury to the cor-
poration it must be borne in mind that management does not
manage for itself and that the beneficiaries of its action are the
stockholders. Conceptualistic phrases describing the corpora-
tion as an entity separate from its stockholders are not useful
tools of analysis. They serve only to obscure the fact that man-
agement has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the
stockholders.' 3
This case may throw into question, but is not necessarily incon-
sistent with, the traditional view that although a corporation may
function for the benefit of its stockholders, it can operate only
through its officers and directors. Accordingly, communications be-
tween a corporation attorney and the corporation's officers and
directors are deemed to be covered by the attorney-client privilege
but communications between the attorney and stockholders are not
covered. Ordinarily, stockholders cannot bind the corporation." 4
It has been suggested that we live in an age of the consumer, and
accordingly the corporation attorney should be charged with a duty
to public stockholders." 5 If the attorney is the guardian of the public
interest, an equally good argument could be made that he should
put the interests of employees, creditors (who may be security hold-
ers), purchasers of the corporations' products, or those concerned for
the environment ahead of the interests of management.0 ' A more
103 Id. at 1101.
"I See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YAME L. J.
953, 956-57, 966-69 (1956). See also Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the
Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. Ray. 1, 9 (1973).
' See Sommer, supra note 1.
See Corporations Under Attack, 28 Bus. LAw. (Special Issue: March 1973). The SEC's
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reasonable view is that the corporation attorney represents those
interests which management and the stockholders have in common.
In a recent report by a Bar Association Committee the inadequacy
of the traditional view that the corporate entity is the client of the
corporation attorney was commented upon. "Management, the
board of directors, and shareholders all may have varying and some-
times conflicting interests in the resolution of a particular issue; and
each may claim to represent the best interests of the corporation."' 07
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the corporation attorney in no way
represents the SEC or the general public.
By adoption of articles of incorporation and by-laws and by ratifi-
cation through proxy machinery and annual meetings the stock-
holders have elected directors who are able to select management
who, in turn, are authorized to employ all agents including lawyers.
To require attorneys to represent stockholders directly is to under-
mine the legal processes by which directors and officers are elected
and manage. It is unlikely that the SEC could or would take the
position that a principal or majority stockholder is owed a duty by
a corporate attorney which transcends the attorney's duty to man-
agement."°8
In certain recent injunctive cases the SEC, by way of consent
decree in situations involving particularly egregious facts of
fraudulent conduct by management, has had special counsel ap-
pointed. It is very unclear what status such special counsel may
have or whom such counsel is representing. 9 Because the special
concern for investors evidences a parochial view of the public interest. On equal employment,
environmental and other similar issues, the SEC has taken a very limited view of its responsi-
bility to consumers other than investors. Id. at 232. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5569
(Feb. 11, 1975).
107 The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged
in Securities Law Practice-A Report by the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and
Liability, 30 Bus. LAW. 1289, 1293 (July 1975).
I' The SEC's view positing a duty beyond elected management would disenfranchise
shareholders who vote to retain management and reaffirm agency commitments. It also
obviates the lawyer's duty to represent management until he perceives a conflict with share-
holders. See Coleman, The Different Duties of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAW 91
(Special Issue: March 1975), and fails to consider the identity of the lawyer's duty and the
director's duty to represent all shareholders even in cases of cumulative voting. See Panel
Discussion, Lawyers as Directors, 30 Bus. LAW. 41, 60 (Special Issue: March 1975).
102 See notes 174"-87 infra and accompanying text.
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counsel is a creation of the SEC, the staff now seems to believe that
he represents the ideal corporation attorney. However, in the case
of a going concern such independence on the part of counsel would
be more harmful than useful. An attorney is not an independent
contractor; he is an agent. ' He does not represent the public inter-
est. He represents a particular client. He is retained by and reports
to management.
The class of persons protected by the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities acts are purchasers and sellers of securities."' However,
the corporation attorney owes his primary duty to the corporation
as it exists at the time of his representation. Any actual or potential
conflict of interest between existing security holders and future pur-
chasers and sellers must be resolved by management against poten-
tial investors. The corporation attorney represents a constituency
which is different from, although it may include, public investors.
Moreover, the corporation attorney owes no special duties to minor-
ity or majority stockholders and must give independent advice
concerning the rights and liabilities of the corporate entity as a
whole.
4. Private Attorney or Government Attorney
The government attorney, like the private practitioner, is an offi-
cer of the court. The government attorney, like the private practi-
tioner, may therefore sometimes be required to put the demands of
justice over the demands of his client or employer. Federal govern-
ment lawyers, whether they work for the executive branch in an
administrative agency or the legislative branch, are subject to the
Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association
and whatever local canons of ethics may apply to lawyers in the
state in which they were admitted to practice."'
The SEC is charged with taking such action as it may find to be
in the public interest and for the protection of investors. The SEC
staff attorney is likewise a public servant, who frequently must act
110 F. MECHEM, AGENCY § 76 (1952).
m Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. T 95,200 (June 9, 1975).
"I Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541
(1974).
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according to the dictates of his own conscience.
In private practice the client is a definite person or an organi-
zation officered by individuals with whom the lawyer deals.
The client's interest influences the lawyer's position. Where
the client is the Government itself he who represents this
vague entity often becomes its conscience, bearing a heavier
responsibility than usually encountered by the lawyer."'
However, the government attorney does not have a monopoly on
deciding what is in the public interest. He is merely an advocate and
official in an adversary system and a political process.", The client
of the federally employed lawyer "is the agency where he is em-
ployed including those charged with its administration insofar as
they are engaged in the conduct of the public business."" 5 The SEC
staff attorney customarily and properly takes his direction from the
Commission. In terms of professional responsibility, the government
attorney's relationship to his supervisors and the SEC is the same
as a corporation attorney's relationship to the management and the
board of directors of a corporation. Although the federally employed
attorney carries a public trust, his client is not the public, but rather
his client is the governmental organization of which he is a part."'
The notion that a private attorney owes a duty to the public
which overrides his duty to his client is alien to the traditions and
ethical standards of the legal profession." 7 Similarly, the notion that
,,3 Address by Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, reprinted
in 33 FED. B.J. 331, 335 (1974).
"I Cf. Panel Discussion: What is the Public Interest? Who Represents It?, 26 ADMIN. L.
REV. 385, 385-88 (1974).
"I Opinion 73-1 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Federal Bar Association,
in 32 FED. B. J. 71 (1973).
"' Id. In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974), the SEC claimed the attorney-client privilege in
relation to communications between the Commission and staff attorneys. Although the court
regarded the claim as one of "dubious relevance," it assumed that a government attorney
could assert the attorney-client privilege in a proper case. If, however, private and govern-
ment attorneys represented the investing public, rather than their corporate or government
clients, neither would be entitled to claim the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, the SEC
staff attorney would have to communicate to and consult with members of the investing
public and the securities industry rather than, or in addition to, the Commission.
"' See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 437, 448 (1974).
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a government attorney's allegiance is to an abstract ideal, like the
investing public, rather than to his employer is contrary to the
Federal Ethical Considerations which were adopted for federal
government lawyers."' Several of these canons are relevant to the
topics discussed in this article.
Canon 5 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client, and further requires the
corporation lawyer to be loyal to the entity, not to a stockholder,
director, officer, employee, representative, or any other person."'
For the government attorney, independence means that "his imme-
diate professional responsibility. . . is to the department or agency
in which he is employed, to be performed in light of the particular
public interest function of the department or agency."' 20
A governmental lawyer, like a private lawyer, is required to repre-
sent a client zealously within the bounds of the law. 12' A public
prosecutor, however, has the duty to seek justice and not merely to
convict. 122 There is no reason why a duty to refrain from the prosecu-
tion of unfair cases should not apply to an SEC staff attorney con-
ducting a formal investigation. Further, where an agency is at-
tempting to expand its jurisdiction by bringing novel cases, as the
SEC has on occasion been inclined to do, the government attorney
has an obligation to consider the constitutional implications of his
advocacy. Unfortunately, as one critic has pointed out, the SEC
staff attorney has not demonstrated the same readiness to assume
that liability for his client's improprieties which the SEC is at-
tempting to impose upon private attorneys. ' ?-.
The only canon of legal ethics which has a different application
for the government attorney is the duty to preserve the confidences
and secrets of a client.
In respects not applicable to the private practitioner the fed-
, See Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J.
1541 (1974).
M, ABA CODE EC 5-18.
M ABA CODE EC 5-1.
M21 ABA CODE Canon 7.
l" ABA CODE EC 7-13.
123 See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 437, 445 n.47 (1974).
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
eral lawyer is under obligation to the public to assist his de-
partment or agency in complying with the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), and regulations and
authoritative decisions thereunder.'2 4
C. Illusory Sources of SEC Authority
Even if, as the SEC claims, it has been authorized by common
law or by the judiciary or by express statutory authorization to enact
substantive standards for attorneys' conduct, current exhortations
to the securities bar avoid reference to such recognized sources.'25
Instead, current doctrine seems based on duties which the SEC
derives from (1) an extension of its general licensing powers related
to direct subjects of regulation, including accountants; or (2) an
extension in court cases of the aider-abettor doctrine.
1. Licensing
With a few exceptions relating to objective standards such as
application forms and minimum financial qualifications, securities
laws do not impose substantive licensing standards for entry into
the securities industry upon broker-dealers, investment advisors,
investment companies or publicly traded companies. Instead, li-
censing procedures under the securities laws are primarily directed
toward adjudicative proceedings designed to suspend or bar persons
who are already in the securities industry from further participa-
tion. Since 1964 these procedures have been extended to allow the
SEC to bring administrative actions against individuals associated
with licensees to determine whether the license should be suspended
or revoked if the SEC finds that such individuals have committed
violations of securities laws. 6
12 ABA CODE EC 4-4.
'2 There are no citations in Garrett's July 4, 1974 address to the State Bar of Texas, but
a reference to the hope that to induce professionals to be less cooperative may prevent major
frauds. See Sonde, The Responsibilities of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws
-Some Observations, 68 Nw. L. REv. 1 (1973). But see Lowe and Kripke, Summary and
Conclusions, 30 Bus. LAW. 223, 224 (Special Issue: March 1975).
"= The provisions of the Exchange Act are illustrative:
(5) The Commission shall, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hear-
ing, by order censure, deny registration to, suspend for a period not exceeding
twelve months, or revoke the registration of, any broker or dealer if it finds that
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This extension to individuals represents a significant departure
from SEC practice prior to the congressional amendments enacted
in 1964.127 To the extent that the SEC has used such authority to
proceed against persons not licensed by the agency, its power is
greater than the regulatory authority of other agencies. The exten-
sion of authority recommended in the Special Study of the Securi-
ties Markets and followed in the SEC's position in seeking the 1964
amendments was thought necessary in order to give the Commission
effective regulatory powers over individuals such as broker-dealer
employees, particularly registered representatives. 12 It should be
such censure, denial, suspension, or revocation is in the public interest and that
such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming such, or any person
associated with such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming so
associated-...
(D) has willfully violated any provision of the [federal securities laws], or of
any rule or regulation under any of such statutes.
(E) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced or procured
the violation by any other person of the [federal securities laws] or of any rule or
regulation under any of such statutes or has failed reasonably to supervise, with a
view to preventing violations of such statutes, rules and regulations, another person
who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervi-
sion ...
15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(5) (1970).
27 See SEC Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., Part 5, 52-56 (1963); 2 L. Loss, SECUaRrEs REGULATON 1314-23 (2d ed. 1961); 5 L.
Loss, SECURmES REGULATION 3379-88 (Supp. 1969); Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 812-15; Milton J. Wallace and
Joshua L. Becker, SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 11252 (1975). For a
discussion of SEC authority against salesmen prior to 1964, see Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137
(2d Cir. 1963).
123 The Report of Special Study of Securities Markets reviewed the existing statutes,
rules and procedures administered by the SEC, and NASD and the New York Stock Ex-
change for the protection of investors. The Report noted that the SEC could institute admin-
istrative proceedings only to revoke a broker-dealer's registration or to suspend or terminate
membership in the NASD, but it could not apply intermediate sanctions or proceed directly
against a salesman. While the Report found that the NASD rules allowed the NASD to
impose a wide range of sanctions directly to an individual salesman, it could not proceed
directly against a salesman without involving the firm. 1 SEC Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 5, 52-53 (1963). As a result
of the existing statutory scheme the Report found that unscrupulous salesmen are able to
participate in improper selling practices and either escape detection or avoid sanctions.
Therefore, the Report made the following recommendation to the Congress:
The sanctions now available to the Commission in respect of selling practice
and similar violations-revocation of a firm's registration with the Commission, or
expulsion from or suspension (for up to 12 months) of membership in an exchange
or national securities association-are sometimes unsuitable to the needs of partic-
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noted that, unlike the procedure which is allowed by Rule 2(e)(3)
for attorneys, the extension of the procedure for revoking licenses of
brokers on the basis of aiding and abetting violations of other per-
sons requires a hearing and places the burden of proof upon the
SEC. Further, even in the exercise of administrative authority over
individuals,the SEC is limited in that its jurisdiction to proceed is
initially based on a licensing case and its sanctions are limited to
preventing the individual from being associated with a licensed ent-
ity, such as a broker or ifivestment company, over whom the SEC
has direct regulatory authority.
The amendments to the Exchange Act made by the Securities
Reform Act of 1975 would appear to limit the Commission's author-
ity to sanction individuals who are not engaged in the securities
business as principals or employees of a licensed entity. The prior
jurisdiction of the SEC under Section 15(b)(7) to sanction "any
person" has been replaced by the phrase "any person associated, or
seeking to become associated with a broker or dealer." 29
The SEC now proposes to extend its authority from the licensee
to the licensee's attorney even though an attorney would not fall
within the definition of "associated person" under the Exchange
Act.' 0 It also seeks to change the duty of the attorney to his clients
in SEC matters to a duty comparable to that of the auditor by
claiming that the attorney must exercise independence from his
clients.' 31 The suggestion that the attorney must take into account
ular cases, especially where the disciplinary action relates to only one or few sales-
men or only one of many branch offices of a firm. The Commission should have
more flexible powers to deal with the latter type of situation, so that it may invoke
measures appropriate for dealing with particular kinds and degrees of misconduct
rather than being limited to the choice between no sanction or an excessive or
inappropriate one.
Id. at 56.
"I See note 126, supra. Such change was effected by Section 11 of the Securities Amend-
ments Act of 1975. Public Law No. 95-29, approved June 4, 1975. The effect of the change on
pending cases is under consideration in an administrative proceeding. See Eybchange Act Rel.
No. 11501 (Sept. 5, 1975).
" Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (1970).
See Sonde, Professional Disciplinary Proceedings; 30 Bus. LAW. 157, 161 (Special
Issue: March 1975); Sommer, supra note 1; as to whether this independence would or could
be prescribed by the SEC even as to accountants see Isbell, An Overview of Accountants'
Duties and Liabilities Under Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1974); ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1503 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974).
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the interest of the public stockholder is not expressly authorized by
Section 19 of the Securities Act and the SEC has not indicated any
other statutory or legal bases for the theory that the public qualifies
as a third party beneficiary of an attorney's representation.
Better authority indicates that the attorney is not required to
represent the public investor to the exclusion of his corporate client.
The SEC's analogy of attorneys to auditors is disruptive of the attor-
ney's duty to his client.'3 2 In issuing opinions addressed to clients,
the idea that an attorney must independently investigate and verify
facts proposes an obligation inconsistent with the position taken by
the American Bar Association. In such opinions, the ABA has con-
cluded that, unless facts supplied by a client are materially incom-
plete or on their face suspicious or inconsistent, the attorney may
rely on facts known to him and may assume on the basis of the facts
and the record that the facts related by his client are accurate for
the purposes of delivering an opinion. 133
2. Aiding and Abetting
The distinctions between the direct liabilities of corporate agents
as directors, officers or experts who may be attorneys and the lim-
ited responsibility of attorneys working solely as attorneys for such
corporate clients was recognized as a part of the holding of the
BarChris case.'34 These distinctions have been blurred in enforce-
ment cases where the SEC has argued that attorneys should be
enjoined from violations of the securities laws, not because their
actions violated the securities laws, but rather because the attor-
ney's actions in some fashion aided and abetted another who vio-
lated the specific wording of the statute.3 ' By borrowing the crimi-
nal concept that an aider and abettor is punishable as a principal,
the statutory standards for liability are expanded when an injunc-
,32 See American Finance, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962); Coleman, The Different Duties of
Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw. 91 (Special Issue: March 1975); Freeman, Liability
of Counsel for Issuer, 24 Bus. LAW. 639 (1969).
' ABA OPINION No. 335 (1974).
'u Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Sommer,
Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get Here?, 30 Bus. LAW. 95, 100 (Special Issue:
March 1975); Folk, Civil Liabilities Under The Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case,
55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
'5 See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student
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tion names not only the issuer, underwriter, director or office spe-
cifically mentioned in the statute (together with their agents, em-
ployees and assignees), but also the attorney not named in the stat-
ute. By reference to the criminal concept of conspiracy, the staff of
the SEC has also argued that proof as to whether attorneys have
aided and abetted requires only evidence of participation, even by
negligence, in an overt action in furtherance of the primary viola-
tion. However, these criminal concepts are inapposite if the courts
do not require proof of the attorney's scienter.'38
Unless an attorney has a pre-existing duty of care which runs to
some unforeseeable portion of the investing public, as does the audi-
tor, he should not be held liable, in an SEC enforcement action or
civil action by anyone other than his client, for negligence in the
performance of his duties. This does not mean that the attorney who
becomes a participant in a securities transaction should be entitled
to escape liability as an aider and abettor merely because he is an
attorney. But, we submit, an agent cannot be held liable for his
principal's torts where the agent owed no duty to the injured party.
This is precisely the point at which the liability of an accountant
and an attorney diverge. 3 ' By refusing to acknowledge the differ-
Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974);
SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,183
(D.D.C. 1973); SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see generally Ruder, Aiding and Abetting, 7 REv.
SEC. REG. 882 (1974). As to defendants who are not attorneys see Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); cf. SEC
v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
'" See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Koenig,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Judge Kaufman
further confused the holding of Spectrum in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., [1974-75
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,017 (2d Cir. 1975) where he stated:
To be sure, the standards of criminal liability for aiding and abetting are not
applicable to SEC enforcement proceedings. . . but to apply Spectrum as sanc-
tioning the district court's conclusion here, as the SEC urges, is to distort that
holding. In Spectrum we ruled that the liability of a lawyer as an aider and abettor
was to be measured by the negligence standard generally applicable to SEC injunc-
tion actions and the high degree of carelessness present there. ...
" See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,781 (7th Cir. 1974) (accountants' duty under Rule 17a-5 of the Exchange Act); cf.
Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, [1974-75 Trans-
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ences between the duties of accountants and attorneys, the SEC
does a disservice to both professions, and fails to provide the courts
with meaningful standards for imposing liability.
By further erosion as to what constitutes acts in furtherance of
statutory violations, facts are allowed to dontrol responsibilities.
Three examples indicate these extensibns. First, the SEC argues if
an attorney prepared an issuer's prospectus (even though only the
officers, directors and experts are required by statute to sign and file
the prospectus), the attorney aids and abets the violation. 3"
Second, if an attorney agrees to prepare an opinion for his own
client's protection, although no statute or regulation of the SEC
requires such an opinion, the attorney aids and abets the violation
of others involved in the transaction by making errors relating to
the extraneous opinion.' Third, an attorney who prepares an
opinion addressed to a potential selling shareholder and corrects
the opinion four days later may be alleged to have aided and
abetted violation of the securities laws in connection with the ear-
lier opinion.' In none of these examples drawn from recent SEC
enforcement cases was an injunction against the attorney a sine qua
non to establishing the primary violation; that is to say it was not
shown that the violation could not be enjoined unless the attorney
was enjoined; nor was it shown that the violation could not have
occurred absent the attorney's conduct. Carried to its extreme, this
factual analysis could be extended to impose liability as an' aider
and abettor upon anyone who performed acts in furtherance of a
securities transaction, such as secretaries, printers, delivery men or
even post office employees. If bad facts ordinarily make bad law,
bad facts selected by a prosecutor to achieve a desired precedent in
the implementation of an enforcement program make even worse
law.
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 95,090 (2d Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1973).
's See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
' See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974).
"I See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 487 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
III. SEC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY OVER THE SECURITIES BAR
A. Licensing As Representatives of Others
Although the securities laws do not provide for explicit regulation
of lawyers, the SEC's Rules of Practice do regulate the conditions
under which any person, including a lawyer, may practice as a rep-
resentative of others. This regulation, however, cannot, consistent
with existing legislation, be extended by the SEC to initial licensing
of lawyers. Because the SEC lacks the requisite judicial power and
expertise, it should not be extended to lawyers' conduct which
occurs outside an SEC adjudicatory proceeding.
Federal administrative agencies, with the exception of the Patent
Office, do not have the right to license attorneys for initial practice
before them. Federal law provides that
An individual who is a member in good standing of the bar
of the highest court of a State may represent a person before
an agency or on filing with the agency a written declaration
that he is currently qualified . . . and is authorized to repre-
sent the particular person in whose behalf he acts.'
The purpose of this statute was to eliminate agency-established
admission requirements for licensed attorneys.'
At the time this statue was enacted in 1965, the Treasury Depart-
ment had an elaborate admissions procedure for the licensing of
attorneys. The Internal Revenue Service was enabled to conduct an
investigation into an attorney's background to determine whether
he was a person of good character and reputation as well as profes-
sional competence.43 The Treasury Department opposed repeal of
such licensing authority on the ground that taxpayers should not
"be represented in their dealings with the service by those who are
themselves tax cheats or otherwise guilty of unethical conduct." It
was pointed out that there was no uniformity of standards among
states on admission or disbarment and, in addition, the states did
5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1970).
' H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. -News, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4170,
4171 (1965).
"I Id. at 4172.
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not have access to important information available to the Depart-
ment on the undesirability of certain practitioners."'
All these arguments were rejected by Congress, which felt that
surveillance by state bar associations was a sufficient guarantee of
professional integrity.'45 It would seem to follow from this well-
considered prohibition against the licensing of attorneys by federal
agencies that the SEC has no legislative authority to establish ini-
tial professional standards for the securities bar. It is submitted that
this prohibition prevents the SEC from judging the competence of
securities lawyers, establishing procedures for their practice of law
other than in a representative capacity in adjudicatory proceedings,
or promulgating legal ethics for securities lawyers.
When Congress gave any attorney in good standing in a state the
right to practice federal administrative law, it did not either "au-
thorize or limit the discipline, including disbarment, of individuals
who appear in a representative capacity before an agency.""'4 This
provision helped assure support of the bill by the Department of
Justice, which wished to retain an element of control over attorneys
and its procedures for disciplining attorneys "on the basis of mis-
conduct observed by Department Boards and Agencies."' 47 This leg-
islative history indicates that the SEC's power to discipline attor-
neys like other agencies may be confined to situations where the
attorney has improperly conducted himself in representing clients
before the Commission.
Since the SEC's authority to discipline attorneys is an implied
power which emanates from the agency's rule-making authority,
this power should be narrowly construed. It is a power which is very
similar to the power of governmental bodies to punish for
contempt.' It has been held, however, that the SEC has no inher-
1' Id. at 4175.
" Id. at 4173.
"' 5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2) (1970).
, Letter from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Hon. James 0. Eastland, June 10, 1963, in
2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4178 (1965).
I Contempt has been defined as "a disregard of, or disobedience to the rules or orders
of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair
the respect due to such a body." 17 C.J. Contempt § 1.
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ent contempt power, but must resort to enforcement of its processes
by the courts.' Since the extent of the SEC's authority to discipline
attorneys is thus unclear, it should not be assumed as easily as the
Commission has assumed it, particularly respecting misconduct
occurring otherwise than in the practice of law before the Commis-
sion.
In Camp v. Herzog,"' the district court vacated an order of the
National Labor Relations Board suspending an attorney. The court
held that
... the power to control, by admission and disciplinary
action, persons who appear before an administrative agency as
representatives of the parties at interest is a highly important
one, but it is not, as is the case in judicial courts of general
jurisdiction, an inherent power, but is one which, if it exists,
is given by the legislative authority creating such agency.,
In the court's view, the provision of the National Labor Relations
Act giving the Board such rule-making authority as may be neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of the Act was sufficient to give the
Board power to prescribe rules relating to practice before it. How-
ever, the :Board had not exercised such rule-making power and,
hence, the Board was not empowered to discipline attorneys.
In Herman v. Dulles,'52 the right of an agency like the SEC to
disbar an attorney from practice before it was upheld by the circuit
court. The bases for disbarment were violations of canons of ethics
of the American Bar Association. Before the proceeding was initi-
ated, the agency had published rules specifying the qualifications
for practice before it. In holding that an agency which had general
"I Shasta Minerals & Chemical Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1964). Accord, City
of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 385 F.2d 629, 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
945 (1947). The reason for this holding is that federal agencies have no judicial power under
the Constitution. I.C.C. v. Brimson, 145 U.S. 447 (1894). Although the power to punish for
contempt is a judicial power, Congress has a limited power to punish for contempt which
flows from its legislative authority. However, since this is an implied power, it can be used
only to punish conduct before the legislative body which threatens its ability to function.
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917). It is doubtful that an agency which has neither the
power to admit attorneys nor cite them for contempt can have the power to disbar them. See
Mullen v. Confield, 105 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
"0 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952).
"I Id. at 136.
152 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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authority to prescribe its rules of procedure also had authority to set
standards for regulating practice before it,' the court cited and
relied only on the Supreme Court's decision in Goldsmith v. Board
of Tax Appeals.'54 The Goldsmith case, however, involved a petition
for a writ of mandamus by a certified public accountant to compel
the Board of Tax Appeals to enroll him as an attorney with the right
to practice before it. Therefore, the court was not required to con-
sider that special relationship between courts and attorneys which
gives the courts general control over a lawyer's professional life.' 5
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did hold that
... the character of the work to be done by the Board, the
quasi-judicial nature of its duties, the magnitude of the inter-
ests to be affected by its decisions, all require that those who
represent the tax-payers in the hearings should be persons
whose qualities as lawyers or accountants will secure proper
service to their clients and to help the Board in the discharge
of its important duties.'5'
In Schwebel v. Orrick,' 7 an attorney disbarred from securities
practice by the SEC attacked the Commission's authority to disci-
pline him. The district court held that the SEC had implied author-
ity under its general statutory power to make rules and regulations
and to take disciplinary action against attorneys found guilty of
unethical or improper professional conduct. Further, the SEC had
adequately implemented this authority by adopting the specific
provisions of Rule 2(e). The court of appeals never considered the
question of whether the SEC had properly exercised its authority,
inherent or expressed, to discipline Schwebel. Rather, it affirmed
the district court's dismissal because of failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies. The effect of the 1965 legislation on the SEC and
the prior holdings of Herman v. Dulles and Schwebel v. Orrick has
not been considered by any court.
In a pending proceeding before the Federal Communications
"I Id. at 716.
270 U.S. 117 (1926).
' See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
, 270 U.S. at 121. It should be noted that the Board of Tax Appeals has neither investi-
gatory nor prosecutorial functions.




Commission a Bar Association has filed a petition which takes the
position that because of the 1965 legislation a federal administrative
agency has no jurisdiction or authority to disbar an attorney or to
suspend his right to practice before it. Rather, such an agency's
jurisdiction to discipline attorneys is limited to the inherent neces-
sary authority to take such remedial action as might be necessary
to assure that adjudicatory proceedings are conducted in an orderly
and decorous manner.158
B. Rule 2(e)
The decisions in which Rule 2(e) was enforced did not discuss
either the extent of the SEC's substantive authority over lawyers or
the question of constitutional or procedural fairness. In particular,
the power to suspend an attorney on the basis of an injunction has
several serious constitutional problems, which must be considered
in the light of Kivitz'55 and Ferguson.' ° In these cases, the SEC
imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 2(e) upon attorneys whose con-
duct occurred not in connection with their appearances before the
SEC, their filing of documents with the SEC, or their discharge of
any statutory duties under the securities laws but rather in their
conduct as attorneys for clients where no appearance before the
SEC was required.
In Kivitz, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
versed a Commission decision which sought to extend its discipli-
nary authority to cover conduct not directly related to an attorney's
statutory obligation as an expert under the Securities Act. The SEC
had suspended Kivitz based on the conclusion that five years earlier
he had engaged in unethical and improper conduct in regard to
conferences on the preparation of a registration statement. Signifi-
cantly, the company had filed no registration statement and, there-
fore, Kivitz had not filed with the SEC a consent to be named as
an expert. The Commission had found that Kivitz allowed a non-
lawyer to set the terms of the legal fee to be received for the registra-
tion statement.
'1 Petition of FCBA Addressed to FCC Jurisdiction, In the Matter of Benedict P. Cot-
tone, F.C.C. Docket No. 20293.
"I In re Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
"I In re Ferguson, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5523 (1974). See also SEC v. The
Senex Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FmD. SEC. L. REP. 95,001 (E.D. Ky. 1975).
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The court found suspension had been based upon inferences from
hearsay testimony that Kivitz would share his fee with another who
would use political influence and employ an accountant willing to
stretch a point to expedite the processing of a registration state-
ment. The court observed that the Commission's opinion had char-
acterized the fee arrangements as "misconduct" but refused to ac-
cept these inferences as sufficient. The court carefully observed that
an attorney's license to practice was a right relating to his general
reputation. It refused to accept the characterization of the disbar-
ment from SEC practice as a specialty developed in the administra-
tion of a statute delegated to the agency. 6 ' Moreover, the court
declined to accept the Commission's findings with respect to an
attorney's conduct as an issue within the particular expertise of the
agency so as to compel the court to accept the Commission's find-
ings of fact as conclusive if supported by any substantial evidence.
On review of the extension of the SEC's regulation of attorneys'
conduct, the court not only reversed the Commission's findings but
directed it to dismiss the proceeding.
A somewhat different standard as to attorneys' duties was sug-
gested, although not in the context of a Rule 2(e) case, in SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., '62 in which the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded for hearing an injunctive case to the district court. This
appellate court accepted with less critical review the SEC's allega-
tions as to an attorney's misconduct and held an attorney could be
subject to an injunction for negligent reliance upon factual represen-
tations in issuing a legal opinion relating to a proposed sale of unre-
gistered securities. (Presumably, the court was not asked to consider
the effect of such an injunction against an attorney pursuant to Rule
2(e)(3)(i), which would authorize the Commission without public
hearing to suspend an attorney permanently enjoined from aiding
and abetting securities violations.)
The judge below had reviewed conflicting affidavits and noted
that there was insufficient evidence that any unregistered stock
had been sold on the basis of the attorney's first opinion and that
a subsequent legal opinion was issued four days after the opinion
which was allegedly negligent. 6 ' The appellate court deemed
"I SEC v. Csapo, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 97,746 (D.D.C. 1974).
162 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
"I Id. at 538-39.
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this latter opinion ineffectual and extended its application of the
aiding and abetting standard to obviate, for purposes of the in-
junction, the requirements of actual knowledge by the attorney of
the improper scheme or intent to further the scheme. It accepted
an argument that negligence could be the basis for an injunction
against the attorney. '64 Without citing authority or considering
the numerous instances in which unregistered securities may be
distributed without legal opinions, the court concluded that the
preparation of an opinion letter is somehow essential for an exemp-
tion for unregistered securities and that the reliance of the public
on these opinions is high. No explanation was made of how the
public relies on the attorney's opinion when it may have been
prepared for and addressed to the benefit of a particular client or
the corporation or its transfer agent but not the purchaser or the
general public. The court sought to emphasize that the standard of
culpability for an attorney on an opinion letter was that of a central
participant and not that standard applicable to "more peripheral
participants in an illicit scheme." ' 5
In Ferguson,165 the SEC instituted, decided and announced a dis-
ciplinary sanction against a municipal bond attorney and his firm
by the same administrative order. Because the order accepted an
offer of settlement which was submitted in advance of any SEC
order, the specific charges against respondent Ferguson were not
clear. Nevertheless, the SEC censured the attorney and found that
he aided and abetted violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act and Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act.' Although the SEC
I" This argument had been rejected as a basis for criminal liability in United States v.
Koenig, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,765, at 96,507 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). It has also repeatedly been rejected as a basis for civil liability. In Jenny v. Hammill
& Co. Inc. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,021 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the
court stated:
It is settled in this circuit that to state a claim under Section 10b there must be an
allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for
the truth or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
Cf., Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., [Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,084 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973).
' SEC Securities Act Release No. 5523 (1974).
' Id. The same attorney, however, was not advised of critical material facts by the
primary violators. According to the decision in the related case dependence upon the attor-
ney's opinion was unsupported by the evidence and misplaced as a matter of law. SEC v.
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order must have been premised on a Commission determination
that some offeror was the principal violator of those provisions, the
offeror was a municipality not subject to an SEC adminstrative
proceeding.
The order described certain undisclosed facts but failed to explain
how counsel's conduct aided and abetted violations. In a related
court case some of these omissions were held not to be material."8
It was implied in the SEC order that the attorney's review of the
official statement, his pre-existing relationship with the developer
on other offerings and other unstated factors which came to his
The Senex Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,001 (E.D. Ky.
1975). See also Muth v. Dechert Price & Rhoads, [Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,030 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
' [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,001 (E.D. Ky. 1975). The SEC
order described its findings as follows:
[R]espondent was bond counsel and ... in addition he assumed principal legal
responsibility for reviewing a prospectus (or 'official statement') used in the offer
and sale through the mails of $4,425,000 in City of Covington Health Care Project
revenue bonds, issued in 1972 to finance the construction of a nursing home in
Covington, Kentucky. It is further found that while acting in this capacity, respon-
dent willfully aided and abetted violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder in
that:
1. The prospectus failed to disclose that:
a. Senex Corporation, developer of the project, had entered into a contract with
a local contractor to construct the nursing home for a contract price which was
$650,000 less than the price for which it had negotiated and agreed with city officials
to construct the facility;
b. The purportedly independent consultant who passed on the need for and feas-
iblity of the project had an agreement to share 50 percent of the developer's profits;
c. Two feasibility consultants, one of which had been specifically hired to render
an opinion about the project had rendered reports bearing unfavorably on the need
for such a project;
d. The project's financial adviser, which received a fee of $135,000, was owned and
controlled by the developer;
e. An independent securities dealer could not be found to underwrite the bonds;
and
f. The financial adviser caused itself to be appointed underwriter for the issue.
2. Because of his review of the prospectus, his pre-existing relationship with the
developer on other offerings of municipal bonds, and other factors which had come
to his attention, respondent should have known, if he did not know, that the pros-
pectus omitted material facts.
The District Court decision held the failure to disclose the information de-
scribed in paragraphs b, c, d, e and f was fraudulent but that the item in paragraph
a was not material.
Id. at 97,461.
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attention should have alerted him to the omission of material infor-
mation. But the order does not find that the attorney had a duty to
review the official statement nor does it seek to define which por-
tions bond attorneys must generally review. Rather, it states that
he "assumed principal legal responsibility." The allegations of
omissions in the complaint referred to shed no light on these mat-
ters. That the attorney consented to a sanction and the imposition
of certain compliance procedures on his firm would not cure the
SEC's apparent lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Municipal se-
curities are exempt from registration and an official statement is not
required to be filed with the SEC by state or federal law.' 9 The order
endorses responsibilities which are not imposed as a matter of state
law upon bond counsel who issue opinions on municipal securities.
Ferguson includes a finding with respect to a related complaint
for an injunction against sellers of such securities, but unlike
Spectrum the attorney was not a party to that injunction so that no
findings could have been used against him if the proceeding had
been brought under paragraph (3) of Rule 2(e). In regard to the
omission, the attorney in Ferguson was neither an expert, director
nor an officer of the municipal issuer or the development company.
Presumably, this is a further extension of the contention by the staff
of the SEC that disbarment proceedings are appropriate against an
attorney who aids and abets another's alleged violation, as yet un-
proven in court, but who is unnecessary to the relief sought in the
injunctive action.
Moreover, the imposition of -the unique sanctions in Ferguson
raise several questions. Unlike the injunctive actions in several ear-
lier cases against attorneys, the Ferguson case is a proceeding
against an individual attorney, although some matters relate to his
entire firm. The five mitigating conditions which were set out in the
SEC's order require, as to municipal bonds, maintaining specific
records as to due diligence, attending educational lectures, em-
ploying letters of representation, maintaining standards of review,
and insisting on certified financial statements. These procedures
appear to involve substantive standards for practice not imposed
on SEC filings, not required to deliver a typical municipal opinion
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970).
788
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as to tax exemption and not related to comparable remedies by
state bar association committees. These undertakings resemble
compliance procedures which the SEC has required of brokers and
dealers over whom it has direct licensing authority. Also, the
specific sanction of censure is not mentioned in Rule 2(e).
Such procedures affect the independence of securities attorneys
from the SEC. To preserve their right to defend clients with total
loyalty, it is imperative that attorneys remain independent of the
federal government and not their clients. To the extent that sub-
stantive standards and compliance procedures may be necessary for
attorneys, it would be more appropriate if such standards and their
enforcement were carried out by the states and the traditional com-
mittees empowered by the judiciary in each state for the regulation
of attorneys.
The Supreme Court has pointed out that although disciplinary
proceedings against attorneys are designed to protect the public,
they are nevertheless a punishment or penalty imposed on the law-
yer. Accordingly, the proceedings are not only adversary but of a
"quasi-criminal nature."'170 Since the SEC is invested with prosecu-
torial functions, it should not be permitted to institute quasi-
criminal proceedings against the attorneys for those corporations
and individuals it regulates. The potential for abuse of power is real
and should be more obvious to the Commission than it apparently
is. Justice may be too easily corrupted if the prosecutor can punish
his vigorous adversaries by initiating disciplinary proceedings
against them.
If the reasoning in Spectrum is followed, the SEC will be allowed
to enjoin an attorney for aiding and abetting an uncompleted trans-
action and thereafter suspend the attorney without any hearing on
the basis of the injunction. Further, Spectrum and Ferguson would
seem to give the SEC authority to regulate the procedures by which
attorneys render legal opinions on securities matters. However, a
direct proceeding pursuant to Rule 2(e) relating to an attorney's
ethical or professional conduct would, under the Kivitz case, have
been beyond the administrative expertise of the Commission. The
SEC would thus accomplish indirectly what it cannot do directly.
,70 In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
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Since Spectrum and Kivitz were decided by different courts, the
cases need not be reconcilable. The approach of the District of Col-
umbia Circuit Court in Kivitz suggests it might have followed the
reasoning of the district rather than the circuit court in Spectrum.
C. Court Implementation
In seeking to establish its policy of changing professional stan-
dards, the staff of the SEC has elected not to comment publicly on
existing standards imposed on attorneys by the judiciary within
each state or the national bar associations but instead has sought
to obtain on a case by case basis court implementation of its views
on professional responsibility. This tendency is reflected in actions
for an injunction against many defendants where some defendants
are subject directly to statutory prescriptions (e.g., issuer, underwri-
ter, seller or reporting company) and other individual defendants
are named in multiple counts as having assisted the primary viola-
tor. The individual defendants are sought to be enjoined from aid-
ing, abetting, counseling and commanding the primary violators.
This is a departure from the traditional complaint where a corpora-
tion or other legal entity is named defendant and the SEC has
sought an injunction against primary violators and their officers,
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and those persons in active
concert or participation with them."' Accordingly, if the complaint
were confined to the primary violator and the court were to grant
specific injunctive relief, there would be no practical reason to ex-
tend the injunction to named officers, directors, attorneys and other
professionals. The contempt power of the court to enforce the in-
junction could not be seriously questioned by any individual receiv-
ing notice and acting in the capacity of an officer, agent or employee
of the corporate entity.
In practice, however, the SEC uses injunctive actions for punitive
and not merely remedial and equitable objectives, and obtains indi-
rect consequences which are not a direct result of the equitable relief
sought in i:njunctions. 72 As pointed out above, the SEC can use an
,7, Rule 65(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.
,72 The standard relief paragraph of an SEC complaint for an injunction requests a court
order that the primary defendants and "their officers, directors, subsidiaries, affiliates,
agents, servants, employees, attorneys, successors and assigns, and each of them and those
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injunction against an attorney summarily to disbar the attorney
from practice before the Commission. The courts have not focused
upon the inappropriateness of relaxing standards of proof to grant
the SEC an injunction in a case like Spectrum, on the ground that
the injunctive action is remedial, when the Commission then uses
the injunction as the basis for a quasi-criminal proceeding. Further,
in particular actions seeking injunctions in recent years the staff of
the SEC has sought to extend its proposals relating to professional
responsibility into new areas involving ancillary relief requested of
courts of equity.1 3 Most important to the securities attorney are the
cases involving the appointment of special counsel for a corporate
defendant. In administering such ancillary relief, the equity courts
have not had the benefit of judicial experience afforded by common
law precedent nor have they had the benefit of legislative history or
statutory construction afforded by specific statutory remedies.
The duties of special counsel, if any, apart from those imposed
upon a lawyer by common law, state judiciary committees, or the
canons of ethics, have not been requested or set forth in court
orders."' Moreover, assuming special counsel were able to define its
persons acting in concert or participation with them" be enjoined. See 30 Bus. LAw 135
(Special Issue: March 1975) (summary of consequences of SEC injunctions). For an instance
where a court declined to extend injunctions against agent-employees to cover the principal-
employer, although the SEC urged respondeat superior liability, see SEC v. Sorg Printing
Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); compare
SEC v. Management Dynamics, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 95,017
(2d Cir. 1975). The SEC apparently made an effort to have legislation enacted which would
clearly deprive the courts of their historic equity discretion to issue or deny injunctive re-
quests. See Letter from Five Securities Lawyers to Conferees on Proposed Change of '34 Act
§ 21(e) 302, reprinted in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. H-1 (May 14, 1975).
" SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (disgorgement of
profits); SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(removing or replacing directors); SEC v. Westgate-California Corp., SEC Litigation Release
No. 6142 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (appointment of a receiver without insolvency). The arguments
advanced for these ancillary remedies rely primarily on implied court powers to fashion and
supervise their administration after the related injunction is entered.
,U' The order appointing special counsel in SEC v. Westgate-California Corp., SEC Liti-
gation Release No. 6142 (S.D. Cal. 1972), reads in pertinent part as follows:
This court shall appoint a Special Counsel satisfactory to the Board of Directors of
WESTGATE and the plaintiff Commission. The Special Counsel.. .shall not be
liable for any action taken or omitted to be taken by him or for any error in
judgment made in good faith by him in his capacity as Special Counsel unless it
shall be proved that he was grossly negligent in connection with such action, omis-
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particular duties, the injunctions have not identified the particular
client owed such duties and have left important questions unan-
swered. For example, if, as the SEC claims, the special counsel like
other attorneys owes a duty to shareholders, what is the effect of the
preference of the majority of such shareholders by proxy to retain
prior counsel or to discharge special counsel? What is the duty of
special counsel with respect to annual meetings of shareholders and
the proxy soliciting authority? What are the relationships between
prior counsel selected by management and special counsel in the
event prior management seeks to continue to function? What is the
effect on subsequent corporate decisions of the provisions in the
injunction which require SEC approval before special counsel can
be selected? What is the effect of selection of special counsel on
pending class actions where at least a portion of the shareholders are
represented by different attorneys? In the event of a simultaneous
or subsequent receivership and the appointment of a trustee under
traditional equitable or bankruptcy powers, does counsel for the
trustee supplant or replace special counsel?
sion, or judgment;. . .The Special Counsel, under the supervision of the Board of
Directors of WESTGATE, shall have the power and be directed to: a. conduct a
full investigation into the previous financial and other affairs of WESTGATE and
shall submit a report to the Board of Directors of WESTGATE, this Court and
plaintiff Commission of his findings and recommendation for action. . . b. take
all appropriate action with respect to the previous financial affairs of WESTGATE
and any other matters as the Board of Directors of WESTGATE and this Court may
direct, including, but not limited to, the institution and prosecution of suits on
behalf of WESTGATE to recover all assets or monies improperly used, taken,
wasted, misappropriated, dispensed, obligated or paid to anyone (i) without appro-
priate authorization, approval or ratification of the Board of Directors of WEST-
GATE or (ii) in breach of duties owed to defendant WESTGATE or its subsidiaries
by present or former officers, directors or employees of WESTGATE or any other
person. The Special Counsel may consult with the Board of Directors of WEST-
GATE and this Court in the resolution of all claims WESTGATE may have. He
shall neither decline to pursue any claim . . . c. pending the investigation by the
Special Counsel, he shall, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of
WESTGATE, take immediate necessary or appropriate action to protect WEST-
GATE's claims, interests, and rights and pursue all possible claims against the
defendants herein or any persons, . . . ; and d. take such further action, subject
to the approval of this Court, as may be necessary or appropriate for the protection
of the shareholders of WESTGATE.
The SEC's authority to obtain ancillary relief of this kind has been critcized as "an
unwarranted and presently unjustified extension of the SEC's power over corporations."
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1210
(1975).
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To date these questions have been dealt with on the basis of a
court of equity retaining jurisdiction over the SEC complaint so that
court permission under expanded equitable principles can be sought
by concerned parties. The number of questions raised by the ancil-
lary remedy of special counsel indicates the widespread effect of this
new theory upon the attorneys who serve as counsel for prior man-
agement, counsel for the primary defendant or even as special coun-
sel. They indicate that the novelty of the relief may be proceeding
far ahead of the courts' ability to define what standards shall be
applicable to attorneys' conduct.
IV. ROLE OF ATrORNEY IN SEC PROCESSING
The SEC's pronouncements on an attorney's responsibility rests
upon a misconception of his work on registration statements. This
was stated in Fields:175
Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in char-
acter. He doesn't work in a court room where the pressure of
vigilant adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in
his office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy statements,
opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff,
the financial committee, and the investing public must take on
faith.",
This characterization was adopted by SEC Commissioner Som-
mer in a subsequent speech to the Bar. 177 As a practical matter, work
as counsel for an issuer or counsel for an underwriter involves a
series of decisions which are adversary. For example, counsel to the
issuer has been required by the instructions of his client and case
law to interpret, at his risk, the exemptions from registration. If an
exemption is not available, the negotiations in connection with the
preparation of a registration statement are frequently adversary.
The review of exhibits and closing papers for the client's protection
frequently takes counsel far from his office as a matter of risk as well
as geography. Even items of routine corporate practice such as an-
nual reports, proxy statements, press releases and minutes of Board
- See In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (1973), [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SE;. L. REP. 79,407 (1973).
01 Id. at 83,174-75 n.20.
"' Sommer, sapra note 1.
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meetings frequently involve the attorney in work where the interests
and even the directions of his client are contrary to those of other
persons, including the SEC. Recent cases on attorneys' liability
demonstrate that such interests require careful and adversary con-
struction not only of the securities laws but also of corporate law and
evidence. 17s The attorney for a registered broker-dealer or invest-
ment company is particularly involved in giving advice where ad-
versary consequences must be evaluated.179 In addition to reviewing
reports and documents for the SEC, such counsel may review mar-
ket letters, negotiate for private placements and defend claims by
customers. The counseling of banks, lending agencies and transfer
agents involves the securities attorney in similar adversary prob-
lems. In each of these practical circumstances the attorney must
assess the developing facts and documents with a careful view to-
ward claims which could be made against his client by numerous
vigilant adversaries, including the SEC.
A review of the instances in which attorneys have found them-
selves the subjects of enforcement actions demonstrates the need for
vigilance from the beginning of any securities transaction through
any filing with the SEC and even after filing. The attorney in Kivitz
was charged with conduct that originated in preliminary discussions
as to representing a client.8 0 In SEC v. Everest,'"' an attorney was
charged in connection with a transaction which was never consum-
mated and which, if consummated, would have required no commu-
nication with the SEC. In SEC v. Spectrum the attorney was in-
volved in the preparation of an opinion which may never have been
used and which may have been corrected four days later.' Charges
m" See SEC v. Mattell, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,754
(D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 5715 and 5798 (D. Kan.
1973); In re Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (1971).
Vo The provisions of §§ 15(b)(5)(E)(i) and (ii), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5)(E)(i) and (ii) have
special relevance in this regard because compliance counsel is generally an employee. He
must elect whether to defend his employer on the grounds of having established and applied
a reasonable supervisory system or having no liability for employees' violations under a theory
of respondeat superior. His involvement as an associated person under § 3(a)(18), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(18) (1970) must also be considered if he has any duty to report the violations of his
employer-client to the SEC. See In re Cabel, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9362
(1971); In re Slater, SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8830 (1970).
2S In re Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (1971).
SEC Litigation Release No. 5209 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
' 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
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by the Department of Justice in United States v. Mitchell concern-
ing practice before the SEC arose from activities in which there was
never any allegation or proof of an attorney-client relationship. 13 In
SEC v. Frank, the attorney's activities involved a technical, non-
legal description of a chemical process.184 The attorneys involved in
SEC v. National Student Marketing are charged with activities
relating principally to the use of a letter which the SEC and statutes
did not require to be filed and which, presumably, had been insisted
on as a special precaution by the attorneys.18 In both Feit"I and
SEC v. National Student Marketing, the underlying transaction
involved an exchange offer in which adversary parties were repre-
sented by separate counsel. Illustrative of a development which
occurred after filing with the SEC is the case of SEC v. Manor
Nursing.187
These sad experiences require an attorney during each stage of the
process of representation to be concerned not only with the conse-
quences to his client, but also, in light of the expansion of Rule 2(e)
and the doctrine of aiding and abetting, with his own involvement
and possible liability. The extensive authority of the SEC to investi-
gate pursuant to Sections 8 and 20 of the Securities Act and Section
21(a) of the Exchange Act requires attorneys to analyze every secur-
ities transaction as a potential subject of investigation.
If, as the SEC has suggested, the attorney must act more like an
auditor, the attorney would have to notify his client at the beginning
of representation that the client must choose between instructing
the attorney to act as an advocate or as an independent auditor.
Carried to its extreme, the attorney-auditor would be precluded
from representing a client who instructed him to test adversarily the
constitutionality or fairness of a securities statute, an SEC rule or
a court interpretation.
' 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
iU 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
's [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974).
" Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
' 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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V. ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY IN SEC INVESTIGATIONS
A. Rules Relating to Investigations
A witness in an SEC investigation is not constitutionally entitled
to all of the procedural safeguards guaranteed in a hearing,' 88 be-
cause an investigation is a fact-finding rather than adjudicative
proceeding.' 9 Such an inquiry may be but rarely is used as an aid
to the agency's legislative or judicial functions. Its purpose is to
inform and report, and it has frequently been analogized to, al-
though it significantly differs from, a grand jury investigation."'
The SEC may conduct formal investigations pursuant to
Commission Order'9 ' whenever it appears that the statutes it ad-
ministers have been or are about to be violated. The purpose is to
ascertain whether information in the Commission's possession tend-
ing to show a violation is accurate, and if so, whether the facts
justify the institution of administrative or injunctive proceedings."'
"' See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); United
States v. Steel, 238 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1936). See generally Mathews, Witnesses in SEC Investigations, 3 REV. SEc. RrG., No. 9
(1970).
I' The classic distinction between rule-making and adjudication is that between govern-
ment functions which historically were legislative and those which historically were judicial.
It has been suggested that a more useful distinction would be between proceedings having
general applicability and future effect and those which do not. See The 12 ABA
Recommendations for Improved Procedures for Federal Agencies, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 389, 389-
91 (1972). Rule 1 of the SEC's Rules Relating to Investigations states that the rules "do not
apply to adjudicative or rule making proceedings." 17 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1974).
"I See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
449 (1960); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950); Consolidated Mines
v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1938).
"I Formal investigations are conducted pursuant to Sections 19(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Act, and Section 21(b) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b), 77t(a), 78u(a),
(b) (1970). Comparable provisions are contained in Sections 209(a) and (b) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 and Sections 42(a) and (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 15
U.S.C. 44 80b-9, 80a-41 (1970).
" See Mines and Metals Corp. v. SEC, 200 F.2d 317, 321 (9th Cir. 1952); Consolidated
Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1938). In White, Weld & Co., 1 S.E.C. 574, 575 (1936),
the Commission described an investigation as "a preliminary inquiry conducted by the Com-
mission to enable it to determine whether grounds exist for the institution of formal proceed-
ings against the respondents. It is not a hearing. It is not in any sense an adversary proceed-
ing. There are no parties. There are no issues." See also Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d
258 (9th Cir. 1938); In re Securities and Exchange Commission, 84 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir.
1936). The decision to institute an investigation is discretionary with the Commission.
Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1947). But see National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,910 (D.D.C. 1974).
ATTORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITIES
The right of a witness subpoenaed to testify in an SEC investi-
gation to be represented by counsel is not constitutionally guaran-
teed,'5 1 but is established by Section 6(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), which provides: "A person compelled to
appear in person before an agency or representative thereof is
entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel
. . "19 The right to counsel is also guaranteed to witnesses in
SEC investigations by Rule 7(b) of the SEC's Rules Relating to
Investigations, which provides:
Any person compelled to appear, or who appears by request
or permission of the Commission, in person at a formal investi-
gative proceeding may be accompanied, represented and ad-
vised by counsel, as defined . . . in Rule 2(b) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice .... 115
The SEC's Division of Enforcement has acknowledged that an un-
fair denial by the staff of a witness' right to counsel of his choice
might constitute a denial of due process under the Constitution. '
The role of the private attorney in SEC investigations is recog-
nized by the Commission as adversary. '97 However, if the essential
nature of an investigation were indeed fact-finding, rather than ad-
versarial, for purposes of the Constitution and the APA, the role of
the government attorney should be no more adversarial than his role
in processing a registration statement. By the same token, if the role
of the private attorney in an investigation is truly adversary, it
should be no less adversary in a licensing proceeding, which is what
the registration process is. Indeed, under the APA it is probably
"I See Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 917 (1965); United
States v. Steel, 238 F. Supp. 575 (1965).
"1 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970). Although there is some authority to the contrary, Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 445-46 (1959), F.C.C. v. Schreiber, 329 F.2d 517, 525-26 (9th Cir.
1964), the better view is that Section 6(a) applies to agency investigations. K. DAViS, ADMIms-
TRATIVE LAW 381 (1970 Supp.); Administrative Conference of the U.S. Report, S. Doc. No.
24, 88th Cong., 1st Seass. 223, 229-30 (1963). See SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966);
Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960); Wanderer v. Kaplan, Trade Cas. 77159
(D.D.C. 1962).
"' 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (1974).
,' See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,608 (1972).
"I Sommer, The Commission and the Bar: Forty Good Years, 30 Bus. LAWYER 5, 10
(1974).
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easier to argue that the Commission's order which declares a regis-
tration statement effective is adjudicatory, and therefore the regis-
trant's attorney and the SEC attorney are clearly functioning as
adversaries. 9 '
Under the new SEC policy the dilemma of the private practitioner
cum public auditor is apparent to any securities lawyer who has
received an inquiry for information about a client's securities
action. 9' 'He is confronted with having to act in any or all of three
roles: (1) as the lawyer for the client at the time of the transaction
("transaction-attorney"); (2) as the lawyer called by the SEC to
testify ("witness-attorney"); or, (3) as the lawyer who will represent
the company in any SEC investigation ("defense-attorney"). The
transaction-attorney must consider whether he and his client should
take the same legal position at the time of the SEC inquiry as they
did at the time of the transaction, confronting all the problems
which hindsight brings to previous transactions. The witness-
attorney must consider such critical issues as whether to testify,
whether to obtain waiver of privileges as to evidence, and whether
to retain separate counsel. Later, he may have to face whether and
in what manner he submits a memorandum to the SEC to counter-
act a staff recommendation and to explain why he should not be
named in an enforcement proceeding.20 In answering these particu-
lar questions, the witness-attorney should be aware of the SEC's
new views on attorney responsibility, because he is not entitled to
see the staff memorandum. The defense-attorney should be aware
of the positions to be taken by the attorneys in their other roles. The
attorney's dilemma is confounded by the SEC's notion that an at-
torney is not an adversary until a formal investigation is
commenced against him or his client.
The reason that SEC investigations are more readily recognized
as adversarial than are registration procedures is that the SEC en-
forcement attorney customarily views his work as prosecutorial. He
is seeking admissions and other evidence for purposes of recom-
"IB See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966); The Wolf Corp. v.
SEC, 317 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1963); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 65.02 (1958).
I" See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,011
(D.D.C. 1975).
2 See notes 241-49 infra and accompanying text.
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mending the institution of proceedings by the Commission and sub-
sequently proving the charges brought." ' Our argument that an
investigation is no more adversary than a registration is intended to
point out the difficulties of subjecting an attorney representing a
client in either type of proceeding to a different standard of duty to
either his client or the SEC. We would not deny the adversarial
qualities of a staff investigation. The facts discovered in an investi-
gation may constitute the primary evidence in a subsequent disci-
plinary or court proceeding. Often, the investigation is utilized by
the SEC prosecutor as a discovery tool not available to the defend-
ing attorney.
Indeed, as an investigator and prosecutor, the SEC staff attorney
is a tough opponent who may exhibit far more concern with winning
his cases or helping shareholder suits than protecting the public
interest. There are three areas where the Commission's staff is par-
ticularly vulnerable to criticism in the conduct of its investigations.
These are its utilization of its sequestration rule, its attitude toward
the Fifth Amendment and its refusal to permit discovery except
under compulsion.
B. Sequestration
One of the mor6 obscure areas in which the SEC staff has been
attempting to impose its views as to the new duties of attorneys is
in the administration of its sequestration rule. This rule provides
that
... all witnesses shall be sequestered, and unless permitted
in the discretion of the officer conducting the investigation, no
witness or the counsel accompanying any such witness, shall
be permitted to be present during the examination of any of
the witnesses called in such proceeding.2
Prior to 1960, the Commission's Rules of Practice provided that
where a witness in an investigation was represented by counsel
• . . such counsel may not represent any other witness or any.
201 See SEC v. Grinnell F. Oliver & Co., 1 S.E.C. 204 (D.C. Ill. 1936); SEC Minute,
[1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,905.
201 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (1974). This is the same rule which gives witnesses the right to
be represented by counsel. See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
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person being investigated unless permitted in the discretion of
the officer conducting the investigation or of the Commission
upon being satisfied that there is no conflict of interest in such
representation and that the presence of identical counsel for
other witnesses or persons being investigated did not intend to
hinder the course of the investigation."3
The reason for the change was not explained either in the release
promulgating the rule,0 4 or in the subsequent release in which the
Commission separated its Rules Relating to Investigations from its
Rules of Practice and set forth the sequestration rule in its present
form."5 The SEC's present sequestration rule contains no standard
by which the discretion of the investigating officer can be exercised
in deciding whether to exclude counsel from representing a witness.
The purpose of the SEC's sequestration rule is to facilitate inves-
tigations and prosecutions, not to protect the rights of witnesses. In
one cage the court justified the necessity and general propriety of
the sequestration rule as follows:
.. . The Commission points out that violations of Federal
Securities laws are often difficult to detect and require exten-
sive investigation; that it may be necessary to determine
whether or not individuals are acting in concert; that investi-
gations frequently are sought to be frustrated by non-
cooperation and even subornation of perjury; that the purpose
of sequestration could be defeated by an attorney advising
witnesses as to the testimony which had been given by
others.0
Consequently, the SEC's enforcement of its sequestration rule has
at times collided with witnesses' right to counsel.
In SEC v. Higashi,"' the SEC sought to enforce a subpoena upon
a director of a corporation who wished to be represented by a corpo-
ration's attorney who had previously appeared as counsel for other
witnesses in the investigation. The Commission's request for an
Former Rule 3(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.
' SEC Securities Act Release No. 4242 (1960).
210 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4677 (1964).
2 SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1966).
2 Id.
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order enforcing the subpoena was granted on the condition that
corporate counsel be permitted to represent the director. The court
held that the right to counsel was granted to witnesses in SEC
investigations by the APA and that right entitled witnesses to coun-
sel of their choice. This right was infringed by the SEC's attempt
to sequester the corporation's attorney. In so holding, the court
pointed out that a director may himself be liable for the acts of the
corporation and, accordingly, the corporation and the director have
interests that may be common. Sequestration of corporation counsel
deprived the director of the services of the attorney most familiar
with the source of his vulnerability and prejudiced the witness'
rights. The court exhibited a sensitivity to the additional cost which
would have to be borne if independent counsel were retained and
the relationship between such costs and the right to counsel con-
ferred by the APA.
An earlier opinion, United States v. Steel,2°8 upheld the SEC's use
of its sequestration rule to prevent one attorney from representing
both a corporation whose affairs were under investigation and a
former officer of the corporation. The case arose on a motion to
dismiss an indictment against the officer. After the corporation's
attorney had been sequestered, the officer appeared to testify in an
SEC investigation without counsel. She thereafter claimed that her
right to counsel had been infringed. The court held that she had no
constitutional right to counsel under the circumstances, and that
even if she had a right to counsel, under the APA the SEC could
impose reasonable limitations on the selection of counsel. It is inter-
esting to consider whether the same result would have obtained if
the questions presented had been in the context of an SEC subpoena
enforcement proceeding.
In the recent case of SEC v. Csapo,0 9 a subpoena enforcement
proceeding, the court held that the SEC could not sequester corpo-
ration counsel to stop him from representing an officer of the corpo-
ration where the counsel had represented a number of other persons
involved in the staff's investigation. The Commission argued there
was an opportunity for a substantial possibility of frustration of the
Commission's investigatory processes flowing from such representa-
1 238 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
10 [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,746 (D.D.C. 1974).
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tion. The court declined to consider the constitutionality of the
Commission'§ sequestration rule, although it noted an apparent
conflict between the rule and witnesses' right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, as well as the APA. The court preferred to base
its holding on the absence of any evidence of misconduct by corpora-
tion counsel.
The SEC's staff position on sequestration was questioned in a
different context in the Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
administrative proceeding. 1 In that case the Division of Enforce-
ment applied to the Administrative Law Judge for an order to pre-
vent the same firm of attorneys from representing both the broker-
dealer corporation named as a respondent and 47 individual respon-
dents who were employees of the corporation. The judge held that
notwithstanding the potential conflict of interest between the corpo-
ration and the employees, since the corporation's law firm had ob-
tained the informed consent of all respondents to their engagement,
such representation could be continued. Although the judge pointed
out that the strictures concerning attorneys' conflicts of interest in
the canons of legal ethics are placed upon the attorney, he did not
challenge the standing of the Division of Enforcement as a non-
client to question the propriety of corporation counsel's continued
representation. It is submitted that staff attorneys have no such
standing. The position taken by the Division of Enforcement as-
sumes the SEC has substantive licensing power over attorneys and
may enunciate legal ethics for the securities bar. Not only is this
assumption unfounded, but the sequestration rule applies only to
investigations. In general, only a party who has a client relationship
to an attorney who undertakes to represent conflicting interests may
be entitled to object to such representation."' Although the govern-
ment may have some legitimate interest in sequestering lawyers in
investigations, the policy reasons which have been used to justify
the sequestration rule do not pertain to administrative proceedings.
The staff's argument in the Merrill Lynch proceeding that it was
trying to protect the rights of the corporation's employees fails to
10 [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,608, (1973).
211 See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Murchison
v. Kirby, 201 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); State v. Garaydorbobil, 89 Ariz. 161, 359 P.2d
753 (1961); Wenzel v. Werch, 256 Wis. 47, 39 N.W.2d 721 (1949).
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show a proper appreciation for the adversarial nature of the proceed-
ing. The employees were respondents against whom the Division
was prosecuting disciplinary proceedings. The respondents retained
counsel to protect them from their prosecutors, who then attempted
to protect the respondents, albeit against their will. To deprive
them of the benefits of corporation counsel could have had the puni-
tive effect of making them individually pay the cost of retaining
personal counsel. Although the hearing examiner recognized cost as
a factor in his decision, he did not make much of it.
Despite older precedents to the effect that the right of counsel is
not constitutionally guaranteed in an administrative investigation,
the viability of these precedents in the light of subsequent right to
counsel cases should at least be questioned.212 However, even if the
rule is constitutional, and not in conflict with the APA, the manner
in which the staff has invoked sequestration in investigations of
corporations and their officers and directors is very questionable.
The Commission's views on sequestration necessarily rest on the
premise that there is a conflict of interest between the corporation
which may have violated the securities law and its officers and
directors who were the agents of any such violation. This is a varia-
tion of the developing (and erroneous) staff view that the corpora-
tion is the representative of public investors, which in cases of
wrongdoing should be investigating and suing its officers and direc-
tors. In cases where the SEC has succeeded in having special coun-
sel appointed to oversee the affairs of a corporation which has egre-
giously violated the securities laws, counsel to the corporation may
indeed play such a role.21 3 However, in the case of an ongoing busi-
ness concern which has fallen under SEC scrutiny, the law should
not indulge in the presumption that there is a conflict of interest
between the corporation and its officers and directors merely be-
cause an agency investigation is initiated. Such a presumption can
only be based on the conclusions that the corporation has violated
the law, that violations were carried out by the particular officer or
"I See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
"I See SEC v. Westgate California, SEC Litigation Release No. 6142 (S.D. Cal. 1973);
SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 5798 and 5715 (D. Kan. 1973).
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director also under investigation, and that the conduct in question
was not within the scope of such individual's employment. These
conclusions are biased and adjudicatory. They should only be made,
if established as true, after a hearing with its attendant protections
of due process.
Moreover, statements made by corporate officers and directors
would ordinarily be admissible in evidence against the
corporation.2 14 Therefore, because of the corporation's potential civil
liability for securities law violations or because of indemnification
obligations the corporation has a legitimate interest in having its
counsel attend the interrogation of its officers or directors. If such
counsel is sequestered, the Division of Enforcement should not be
permitted to use as admissions testimony adduced against the cor-
poration in a subsequent trial.2t5
C. The Fifth Amendment
In any investigation where an attorney represents a client in-
volved in serious wrongdoing, the attorney must advise his client to
testify or to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. When
this privilege is pleaded, the SEC's ability to gather evidence is
obviously frustrated, and such frustration breeds a temptation to
take vindictive steps.21 Moreover, many staff members look askance
at attorneys who represent clients who invoke this privilege.
The SEC cannot bar a person from association with a broker-
dealer or other regulated entity solely on the ground that such per-
214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 286, 288 (1958); 4 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 1078
(Chadbourne Rev. 1972). See also Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1947); Rubin v.
General Tire & Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
225 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), reh. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971); Singer Corp.
v. NLRB, 63 CCH LAB. CAS. 11,002 (8th Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d
1244 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 93 (1970); City of Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Electric Co., 210 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
22 See Morrison, The Fifth Amendment, 3 REv. SEC. REG. No. 6 (1970). It may seem
obvious, but without the Fifth Amendment there could have been no ratification of the
Constitution including the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 and without the com-
merce clause there could have been no federal securities laws, no SEC. Perhaps, then, consid-




son had claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. A stock
exchange, however, can take disciplinary action against persons
subject to their regulation for failure to give testimony to exchange
examiners. Such compulsion has been held not to violate the
Constitution.217 ,
Because the brokerage community and the securities bar are rela-
tively small, the pressures against a witness invoking this privilege
under the Fifth Amendment are great. This erosion of the privilege
under the basic bill of rights of all citizens has been accelerated by
the SEC's efforts to compel attorneys to come forward to the federal
government with evidence against clients and former clients. Where
the attorney himself is charged with wrongdoing, the SEC has even
greater leverage in obtaining information in possible derogation of
the privilege against self-incrimination because an attorney is per-
mitted to breach his duty to preserve the confidences and secrets
of his client in order to defend himself.218
Although a director, officer, employee or stockholder of a corpora-
tion may enjoy a Fifth Amendment privilege as an individual, the
corporation with which he is associated does not 9.21 Further, the
extent to which conversations between such persons and the cor-
poration's attorney are protected by the attorney-client privilege is
unclear. 2 As a result, the corporation attorney may be placed in an
unconscionable position if he is subpoenaed to testify, particularly
if his own conduct may be under scrutiny. If he testifies without
an appropriate waiver from his client, he may be breaching legal
ethics. If he refuses to testify, he may be named as an aider and
abettor by the SEC.22' The grounds upon which he can refuse to
testify, at least if his client was a corporation, are less than clear.
217 United States v. Solomon, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,948 (2d Cir. 1975).
2,M See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1975).
" See United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959). The holdings in the federal
courts on the ability of an attorney to assert the Fifth Amendment on behalf of a client are
not uniform. Compare United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963), with Bouschor
v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
m See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971); United States v. Koenig, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,414
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE
L.J. 953 (1956).
"I See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 437, 460-62 (1974).
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The claim of work product privilege as a shield for protecting a
client's constitutional rights was suggested in the case of In re
Terkeltoub.2 Whether this claim is available with respect to infor-
mation obtained by an attorney prior to the time a Formal Order
of Investigation is obtained by the SEC's staff is open to question. 23
It is submitted, however, that the existence of the work product
privilege in response to a government inquiry should not be
contingent upon whether an attorney was retained before or after
litigation has been initiated. The privacy of a client's consultations
with his attorney and his attorney's deliberations should be an im-
portant component of the constitutionally protected right to
counsel. 24
Because the government cannot compel a person to become a
witness against himself, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment,
either voluntarily or through mechanical eavesdropping devices, 25
it should not be able to circumvent this protection by extracting
such testimony from an attorney with whom the witness believed he
was free to consult in confidence.
D. Discovery
The attorney serving as counsel for corporate or individual targets
of an SEC investigation can no longer be content with advice to his
client in which he outlines the statutory or regulatory consequences
of the investigation in terms of administrative proceedings, 2  civil
injunction 21 and possible criminal references.2 8 Rather, the attor-
ney in order to inform his client fully must point out that the attor-
ney may himself become a target of the investigation. The prospects
for appointment of special counsel to replace the defending attorney
must also be analyzed. 2 9 In those instances where the defense-
222 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See notes 282-85 infra and accompanying text.
2 See Garfinkle v. Arcata National Corp., BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 272, A-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
22 See United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1974).
21 See In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
22 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d), (3) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e) (1970).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 780(b) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e) (1970).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970).
229 See note 174 supra. See Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyer Under the Federal Securities
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attorney was also the transaction-attorney, he probably should ad-
vise the client that he may be called as a witness and that the staff
may inquire as to the client's position on the attorney-client privi-
lege23° or as to matters within the attorney's work product relating
to other civil litigation.2sl In this respect, notwithstanding the posi-
tion expressed in speeches and in the report of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Enforcement Policies and Practices,3 2 the SEC investiga-
tion and its related rules do not afford counsel full and fair discovery
of the SEC enforcement case to obtain information to advise his
client.
During an investigation, the power to subpoena information and
witnesses is a one-way street. Unlike the SEC staff-attorney who
can go forward to obtain information, the defense-attorney is un-
able to issue subpoenas until and unless an administrative pro-
ceeding is commenced or unless the Federal Rules apply in a civil
proceeding. 233 Counsel must deduce those areas in which his client
faces principal risk from the list of documents requested of his
client, or from other persons under investigation whose attorneys
will cooperate with him. If the SEC subpoena is a broad list of
companies and documents, the defense-attorney is virtually power-
less to question relevance or to determine which particular docu-
ments or companies are critical. Similarly, during the course of an
examination when documents from other sources are shown to a
witness, the defense-attorney is powerless to discover where the
documents came from or to take depositions as to their reliability.
In complex cases, such documents may have a neutral significance,
but related testimony can be of great importance. Yet counsel for
the defense-attorney has no right to obtain relevant testimony of
other witnesses. 234
Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 142 (Special Issue: March, 1975).
211 If the SEC eventually obtains ancillary relief in the form of a majority of new direc-
tors, these directors could waive an attorney-client privilege which the previous directors
asserted.
"' SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974).'
212 Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices, June 1,
1972 [hereinafter cited as Wells Report].
'm See 17 C.F.R. § 201 (1974); Rules 34 and 45, FED. R. Civ. P.
17 C.F.R. § 201 (1974). Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); See Villani
v. NYSE, 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 367 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5571 (1975).
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These disabilities are not cured by examination of the SEC's
Formal Order2 because the typical order recites only that the staff
has reported information to the Commission which indicates there
may have been violations of certain provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws. Moreover, the defense-attorney cannot get the memoran-
dum of the staff which requested the Order of Investigation or any
subsequent request for enforcement proceedings.21 This inadequacy
is implicitly recognized by the recommendation of the Wells Report
and the partial adoption of its recommendations. 21 Nevertheless,
discovery remains limited. Further, under recent practice, presuma-
bly designed to restrict the staff from usurping the Commission's
authority, the staff-attorney is restricted from discussing settlement
with a de:fense-attorney prior to the bringing of the enforcement
action.21
The limitations on discovery by private attorneys have been ex-
plained only through SEC reaction to requests for information, the
use of Rule 5 of the Rules Relating to Investigations, and the SEC
defense to production of documents under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.' However, the SEC has never been required to articulate
or defend the reasons for keeping an investigation private. If the
SEC trusted the adversary process as a device to arrive at truthful
results, it would consider the adoption of provisions comparable to
federal discovery rules during its investigations. In the event the
rationale for the secrecy is to protect the parties investigated, the
SEC should consider whether a waiver by any witness should allow
discovery of the testimony given and documents produced by the
witness. 20 If the rationale is that such secrecy relates to a particular
type of document or testimony obtained, the SEC should consider
the adoption of general discovery rules together with the opportun-
ity for protective orders which would allow the staff to maintain its
confidentiality for certain documents.
= 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(a) (1974) (Investigations Rules).
m See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. $1 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974).
21 See Wells Report, supra note 232.
= See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. $ 95,011 at 97,529 (D.D.C. 1975).
= 17 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1974). See In re Bader, Freedom of Information Act Release No. 1
(1975).
214 See Committee Reports, Government Databanks and Privacy of Individuals (H.R.
16373 and S. 3418), 30 RECORD Ass'N BAR 55, at 97 (1975).
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E. The Wells Report
Prior to the crystallization of its enforcement program against
attorneys, the SEC authorized a review and evaluation of its en-
forcement practices.24 The Advisory Committee on Enforcement
Policies and Practices which was appointed on January 27, 1972,
conducted a remarkably expeditious review and reported its recom-
mendations on June 1, 1972.242 The recommendations of the Com-
mittee were adopted on only a limited basis.24 3
The most significant impact of the Wells Report is the new proce-
dure which allows the defense-attorney for targets of investigations
to submit a memorandum to the Commission, counter to the staff
recommendation, as to why his clients have not violated the securi-
ties laws. 24 This is permitted in cases where the recommendation
of the staff is to file for an injunction or to start an administrative
case. In the preparation of this memorandum, the defense-attorney
is limited because he is unable to see any staff memoranda, so he
must anticipate all charges arising out of the Formal Order or any
divergent path which the investigation has taken. In this regard
it is imperative that the defense-attorney preparing the memoran-
dum, if he has replaced another attorney, consult with the trans-
action-attorney. In the investigation, if the staff makes charges
relating to professional conduct, the witness-attorney must consider
whether to submit his own memorandum. In this regard any
witness-attorney must consider whether to ask his client to waive
the attorney-client privilege, and whether to retain separate counsel
to prepare his statement and argue his cause. In the light of the
paucity of standards and the apparent indecision by the SEC as to
naming individual attorneys, 4 full partnerships,2 146 attorneys pri-
marily involved and attorneys secondarily involved,247 the task of
2M BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 137, A-5 (February 2, 1972).
242 See Wells Report, supra note 232.
242 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310 (1972).
244 Id.
245 See SEC v. Vesco, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,777
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. International Camra-Corder Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,666
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
2I See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Sitomer, Sitomer & Porges, [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,184 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
21 See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (as to defendant Shiffman);
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the attorney who must prepare a submission on behalf of a fellow
attorney is difficult and his path to defending his client is un-
charted.
Implicit in the Wells Report was a recognition of the SEC's argu-
ment that it has implied powers over attorneys beyond its express
statutory limitations. Without any citations the Report com-
mented:
A major development in the past several years has been the
expansion of the Commission's oversight over the activities of
lawyers, accountants and other professionals. In a number of
court actions and administrative proceedings the Commission
has taken the position that these professionals in certain cir-
cumstances are accountable under the securities laws for ac-
tions undertaken in their professional capacities. The position
adopted by the Commission in these cases has been controver-
sial and is compelling a rethinking of traditional professional-
client relationships and obligations. The process of articulat-
ing appropriate standards of conduct and reconciling fiduciary
and public responsibilities, however, has only begun."'
The focus of the Advisory Committee, however, dealt with spe-
cific enforcement problems and did not approve an incursion into
general professional standards. The implications of recent speeches
and cases go far beyond the scope of the Advisory Committee's
study. Scores of attorneys who practice in areas of corporate respon-
sibility have never been required to consider the SEC position on
their qualifications or standards. As a general rule, there are no
requirements for knowledge of securities laws for qualification for
state bar examinations. Courses in securities laws are not required
for initial standing to apply for admission. Consequently, even if
there are implied powers for quasi-judicial agencies such as the SEC
allowing regulation of conduct by professionals before them, the
question of where to draw the lines between initial entry to a pro-
fession (which has nothing whatsoever to do with the SEC) stand-
ards for subsequent conduct involving a client, and final confronta-
tion in an investigation with the SEC (which has some quasi-
judicial control over professional activities at that point) is more
difficult than the SEC admits.
SEC v. Everest Management Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 5209 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
24" Wells Report, supra note 232 at 9.
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Instead of dealing with the difficult problems as to where or when
the SEC should influence the bar, the current policy arises out of
the conclusion by the SEC that certain problems in the securities
industry are unsolved or increasing. The SEC would then require
the professions to solve the industry's problems because of con-
gressional limitations on the SEC. This is akin to a conclusion that
because you have something to do with the problem you must help
in solving it and, worse still, if you fail to help in solving it, proceed-
ings would be taken against you for violation of your professional
duties. The same argument could have been advanced for other
problems which the Federal Government for myriad reasons has
been unable to solve, whether in the field of energy limitation,
international balance of payments, housing programs or ecological
decay. 249
In attempting to extend its authority to the regulation of the
securities bar, the SEC is laying itself open to the criticism that its
enforcement program against attorneys is merely another weapon in
the prosecutor's arsenal. Attorneys who have been sequestered may
feel that they are being discriminated against for vigorously defend-
ing their clients. Attorneys who have clients who claim the Fifth
Amendment and then find themselves targets of a Commission in-
vestigation may likewise feel righteously indignant. Attorneys who
are named as defendants in an SEC injunction and then find they
are unable to discover the basis for the staff's recommendation that
they be enjoined may believe that it was to enable the SEC to obtain
an adversarial advantage in its case against their client.
The work of the SEC as a regulator of the securities markets, as
well as the adversarial system upon which our legal institutions
depend, are too important to be undermined by enforcement actions
against a professional group the Commission does not license. All
persons are constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel in
their dealings with the Government. In the light of these existing
protections the Government should not lightly or easily be per-
mitted to deprive anyone of adequate adversary representation by
wielding the power to prosecute the vigorous defender.
2"9 See Garrett, Changing Concepts in Business Ethics, 30 Bus. LAW. 7 (Special Issue:
March, 1975).
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VI. A DOUBLE STANDARD-THE CONDUCT OF STAFF ATTORNEYS VS.
THE CONDUCT OF PRIVATE PRACTiTIONERS
Another telling argument against the duties which the SEC is
preaching to attorneys is that in cases where SEC staff-attorneys
have been urged to assume similar duties, the SEC has asserted
privilege and resisted responsibility.
A. Responsibility for No-Action Letters vs. Responsibility for
Opinion Letters.
As explained earlier in this article,"' government attorneys are
required to observe the same professional ethics as private attor-
neys. One of the canons fully applicable to the federal lawyer is the
stricture to represent a client competently.2 5' A lawyer may not seek
to limit his individual liability to his client for malpractice. If a
lawyer handles the affairs of his clients properly he has no need to
do so; if he does not, he should no longer be permitted to perform
such work.211
In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. ,253 the Commission urged that the neg-
ligent issuance of an opinion letter by an attorney was actionable
in an injunctive action instituted by the SEC. Similarly, in United
States v. Koenig,54 the Government argued that an attorney was
subject to a higher standard of conduct than the lay defendants in
a criminal securities case. These views embrace the dual duties
which the SEC has attempted to devolve upon attorneys to inves-
tigate facts and interpret the law as the SEC would interpret it.255
At the same time that the SEC has been developing this high
standard of care for the private practitioner, the Commission has
refused to assume responsibility for the issuance of legal opinions by
SEC staff members. Such opinions are usually rendered by SEC
staff-attorneys in response to inquiries from members of the public
10 See notes 112-24 supra and accompanying text.
25 ABA CODE EC 6-1.
252 ABA CODE EC 6-6; ABA CODE DR 6-102.
2 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
2 See Lovwenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis
of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 425-
26 (1974).
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or their attorneys."' The advice may take either of two forms: an
interpretative letter, which is little different in form or function
from a letter of advice from a private attorney, or a "no-action"
letter, which is a statement of a policy decision as to whether prose-
cutorial discretion would be exercised to pursue a possible violation
of the securities laws.s7 In its release preliminary to making "no-
action" correspondence publicly available, the Commissiori de-
scribed "no-action" and interpretative letters as "the expert views
of the staff on novel questions of law or on the application of existing
principles to novel or unusually complex factual situations."' ss
In Professional Care Service, Inc.,29 the Commission's views with
respect to "no-action" letters were enunciated as follows:
...the no-action letter process is merely an informal mecha-
nism by which private persons and their counsel may seek
either interpretative advice from individuals familiar with the
federal securities laws or an indication of the staff's enforce-
ment attitude toward a particular transaction prior to its con-
summation. The Commission is not bound by these staff re-
sponses nor do the staff responses purport to be an official
expression of the Commission's views ...
. ..The staff responses in no-action letters only purport to
represent the views of the officials who give them.260
The staff-attorney who gives "no-action" or interpretive advice is
acting in two capacities: as a governmental official and as an attor-
ney for the SEC. The cases which have thrown into question the
Commission's view that it is not responsible for the opinions of its
staff-attorneys have not analyzed whether the nature of any liability
sought to be imposed is akin to the liability of a private attorney
who renders legal opinions.
In SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, '1 a stockholder
of Dow Chemical Co. petitioned the court of appeals for review of
"I Staff members are permitted to render such advice in an effort to inform and assist
the public in complying with the securities laws. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1974).
211 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4924 at 2 (Sept. 20, 1968).
2' Id. at 4. This correspondence was made public in response to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
211 [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,770 (1974).
2- Id. at 84,079-80.
261 434 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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an SEC "no-action" letter. The stockholder had submitted to Dow
a proposal for inclusion in the company's proxy statement. Dow had
written to the SEC requesting staff review of Dow's decision to omit
the proposal. The Chief Counsel for the Division of Corporation
Finance, by letter to Dow stated that his Division would not recom-
mend any action if the proposal was omitted from Dow's proxy
material. The stockholder requested and obtained Commission re-
view of Counsel's opinion, and the opinion was affirmed.
When the stockholder initiated court action, the SEC asserted
that its action was not a "reviewable order" under Section 25(a) of
the Exchange Act. The court held that such action was reviewable,
either in a district court or a court of appeals. It should be noted,
however, that reviewability is not tantamount to liability. An SEC
attorney is immune from liability for discretionary action taken
within the scope of his authority.262 A federal agency cannot even be
held liable for issuing an order which constitutes aiding and abet-
ting a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities law." 3
The court in the Medical Committee case reasoned that there was
no difference, insofar as reviewability was concerned, between a
"no-action" decision and a decree binding a party to perform or
refrain from performing some act. Further, the Commission's proce-
dures were sufficiently formal to make its determination a review-
able order. In part, the court based its opinion upon its finding that
the SEC's procedural regulations governing proxy proposals incor-
porate the basic theory of an adversary encounter between a share-
holder and management. However, in a case where relief was sought
by a business concern which had requested a staff opinion under the
Investment Advisors Act to enjoin threatened enforcement action,
22 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970). It is noteworthy that the allegation of perjury in the course
of his duties by a high SEC official resulted in disciplinary proceedings against him by the
state bar to which he belonged, but not the institution of Rule 2(e) proceedings by the SEC.
BNA SEC. REe. & L. REP. No. 243, Y-1 (March 5, 1975). See also SEC v. Blatt, [1974-75
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,026 (S.D. Fla. 1975); White v. Jaegerman,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); BNA SEC. REQ.
& L. REP. No. 295, A-28 (March 26, 1975).
213 Safeway Portland Employees' Fed. Credit Union v. FDIC, [1974-75 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,899 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Brown v. Commonwealth, [1974-
75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,049 (6th Cir. 1975). The SEC also would
be immune from liability for negligently issuing a legal opinion. Kenler v. Canal Nat'l Bank,
489 F.2d 482 (.st Cir. 1973).
ATTORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITIES
the court held that the issuance of a "no-action" letter with Com-
mission approval was reviewable. 264 The decision implicitly recog-
nized the adversarial nature of the staff-attorney's role.
It should be noted that the affirmance of Counsel's opinion by the
Commission in the foregoing cases was a departure from normal
SEC practice in which the Commission does not review a "no-
action" letter. Kixmiller v. SEC265 involved a "no-action" letter
issued by the Counsel to the Division of Corporation Finance, con-
curring in the opinion of the Washington Post Company to exclude
a stockholder's proposal from its proxy material. The Commission
declined to review the staff's position. The court held that in the
absence of such review by the Commission, the "no-action" letter
was not reviewable by the court. In the court's opinion, staff mem-
bers of the Commission have no authority, individually or collec-
tively, to make "orders."
The distinction drawn by the court between the Medical
Committee and Kixmiller cases seems to have been premised on the
view that a "no-action" letter is the act of a government official
rather than a lawyer's opinion letter. Yet, such letters are opinion
letters, and at one time were even so designated by their authors. 266
In addition to resisting suits directly challenging the correctness
of a staff legal opinion, the Commission believes that its letters are
not dispositive of the legal issues raised on the applicability of the
federal securities laws to a given transaction; that is to say, they
may not be relied upon by third parties. This view was recently
expressed as follows:
A no-action letter is not binding in a court of law on the ques-
tion of the liability of an issuer for permitting a sale of its
securities without registration under the Securities Act of 1933,
nor would a letter stating a no-action position preclude an
issuer from maintaining that a sale of its unregistered securi-
tites would be in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933.67
,6, Potomac Federal Corp. v. SEC, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,704 (D.D.C. 1974), dismissed on other grounds, 94,815 (D.D.C. 1974).
2- 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
M75 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1895 (2d ed. 1961).
2I Professional Care Services, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
815
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Some courts have accepted such a limited conception of a staff
attorney's opinion. 8 Other courts have held that a "no-action" let-
ter may be binding in a court of law.2 19
If, as the Commission has been urging, a private practitioner is
liable for an improper opinion letter, a government attorney should
be held to a similar standara of professional responsibility. If, as one
lawyer claims, and the SEC agrees, a private attorney's opinion is
the "pass-key" to an illegal securities transaction, 0 a "no-action"
or interpretive letter by a government attorney should be binding
on the SEC. In our view, the importance of both types of legal advice
has been overemphasized.271 An attorney who renders an erroneous
legal opinion should be held responsible to his client, not to the
general public.
B. Executive Privilege vs. Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Attorney's Work Product
As stated earlier in this article, the privateoattorney has a duty
to preserve the confidences of his client, whereas the government
attorney has a duty of disclosure insofar as he must assist his client
in complying with the Freedom of Information Act.7 2 The SEC,
however, while attacking the attorney-client privilege of the corpo-
ration attorney, has been assiduous in preserving its own secrets.
The nature and scope of the privileges enjoyed by either the cor-
poration or government attorney are unclear because of the clash of
public policy considerations involved. The public's interest in free
disclosure must be balanced against the client's interest in confi-
dentiality. ]Pronouncements by SEC Commissioners to the effect
that, at least in the disclosure process, attorneys do not act as advo-
79,770 (1974).
2S See, e.g., Kenler v. Canal Nat'l Bank, 489 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1973).
2 See Gasarch v. Ormand Industries, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kanton
v. U.S. Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965). See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
4024 (Supp. 1969).
"I See Sommer, supra note 1; Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties
and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231
(1973).
2'1 Even an erroneous legal opinion by a lower court trial judge imposes no liability for
negligence or misinterpretation of law.
22 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
ATTORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITIES
cates for corporate clients but have a responsibility to the investing
public,2 3 have only confounded'the issues.
Where legal advice is sought from a private attorney, the commu-
nications relating to that advice made in confidence by the client
are, at the instance of the client, permanently protected from disclo-
sure by the attorney. ' Whether communications between a govern-
ment attorney and officials employed by his agency are protected
by the attorney-client privilege is problematic. 25 However, such
communications may be protected by executive privilege which
"obtains with respect to intra-governmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which government decisions and policies are
formulated. 2 6
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, a private attorney has
the work product privilege with respect to his interviews, state-
ments, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions and
personal beliefs generated in the preparation of a client's case. 27 A
government attorney may also be entitled to claim the work product
privilege. 8 The work product privilege of a government attorney
would not appear to be more extensive than executive privilege.
Both would be limited by the Freedom of Information Act. 29 The
work product privilege of a private attorney, however, covers a much
broader range of communications than those covered by the
attorney-client privilege.
The public policy justification for all the privileges granted to
"3 See, e.g., Garrett, Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws, Address to
State Bar of Texas, July 4, 1974.
4 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'5 See Poirer, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J.
1541, 1543 (1974). But see SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974).
"' Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena., 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966).
277 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947). When the work product privilege
attaches to the work of a securities lawyer has been thrown into doubt by Garfinkle v. Arcata
National Corp., 272 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
21 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
Sac. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974). See also SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 95,011 (D.D.C. 1975); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied
to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955 n.9 (1956).
"I See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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attorneys, including executive privilege,28 is to promote free and
frank discussion between clients and their attorneys.
In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers
by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the
legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit
such disclosure except on the client's consent.2'
An important related justification for the work product privilege
accorded a private attorney is to protect persons against improper
intrusion by governmental officials into their affairs.
The constitutional underpinnings for the work product privilege
were pointed out in the case of In re Terkeltoub,282 in which the
Government made an application to compel an attorney to testify
before a grand jury concerning a meeting between his client and a
third party. The client had been indicted for perjury. It was alleged
that the meeting concerned an attempt to persuade the third party
to give false testimony at the perjury trial. The court held that the
attorney-client privilege was not available because the testimony
sought related to a meeting with a third party and because the
conversation amounted to or looked toward the commission of a
crime.2 1a The attorney argued that compelling his testimony would
deprive his client of due process under the Fifth Amendment and
the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The
court agreed.
Because privacy is so vital to these preparatory efforts, the
prosecution is forbidden to eavesdrop or plant agents to hear
counsels of the defense. ...
The ultimate interest to be protected is the privacy and
confidentiality of the lawyer's work in preparing the case. It is
the violation of that interest that is held offensive to the Con-
stitution in the cases of eavesdropping and spying. The protec-
tion would be a thin illusion if the Government could have for
See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena., 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 n.17 (D.D.C.
1966) ("uninhibited communication").
25 8WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
=Z 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Id. at 6&1 n.2.
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the asking what it has, in rare lapses, sought by less genteel
means.
2 14
In Terkeltoub, Judge Frankel pointed out that the Government
was trying to deprive a private attorney of a privilege that govern-
ment attorneys are quick to seize:
• . . [N]o lawyer, on any side of any case, would consider it
salutary for his client that the opposition knew who was being
interviewed and what was being said during such meetings. If
vivid illustration were needed, it is supplied every day by the
Government's stout resistance to discovery efforts by defen-
dants in criminal cases."'
The SEC has put up as stout a resistance as any federal agency
in protecting its secrets. In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ,286 certain
of the defendants were alleged to have conveyed adverse material,
non-public information, to other defendants, who sold shares upon
such information before the information was made public. The de-
fendants moved for the production of a detailed report and other
documents which purported to trace the history and intent of the
law on inside information and set forth a series of guidelines for
financial analysts, corporate management investors, lawyers and
the industry as a whole. The SEC's claim of executive privilege with
respect to such documents was sustained.
In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,2s7 the SEC moved
for production of documents by a defendant law firm and attempted
to resist a counter-motion for production. The court held that the
work product shield applies only to documents prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation, and noted that the point in which the SEC's
investigation blossomed into litigation was by no means clear cut.
The basic inconsistency in the SEC's position of requesting discov-
ery of the defendants and resisting discovery by them was not noted
by the court, which treated the parties as adversaries and ordered
mutual production of the documents.
2" Id. at 685.
= Id.
2" [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,825 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"1 [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974). See also
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 95,011 (D.D.C. 1975).
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Work product and executive privilege were again successfully as-
serted by the SEC in SEC v. Geoteck Resources Fund."8 The court
there stated that the Government has the burden of sustaining a
claim of privilege, and must demonstrate that the public interest
would be harmed by the disclosure of the information. Nevertheless,
the court allowed the SEC to keep its files secret on the rather
general rationale that denial of the privilege would complicate and
delay law enforcement proceedings. No special showing of detrimen-
tal effect on the particular case was required to be made.
In SEC v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.,21 a defendant
accounting firm sought by way of counterclaim an order enjoining
the SEC from withholding from the accounting firm information
concerning their clients, material to the accountant's examination
of statutory financial statements. The accounting firm argued that
the SEC's only motive in withholding the information was the im-
permissible one of gaining an adversarial advantage in the litiga-
tion. The accountants cited SEC pronouncements that it could not
work with accountants in "an adversary atmosphere." The court
held that the SEC had administrative discretion to withhold the
information sought.
The court relied upon the SEC's regulation implementing the
agency's executive privilege, which provides that information or
documents obtained pursuant to an investigation by the SEC shall
be deemed confidential and may not be released unless such release
is authorized by the Commission as not being contrary to the public
interest.2 1 ] n general, the Commission does not authorize such re-
lease. Although the Freedom of Information Act 21 has opened up the
files of the SEC to some extent, there are significant exemptions in
the statute which give the Commission substantial claims of execu-
tive and work product privilege. Even under the recent liberalizing
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, 92 the SEC may
' [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,039 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
251 [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,852 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-4; see SEC Minute, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 77,905.
291 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
29 Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561 (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7) (1970). The purpose of the amendments to the Freedom of Information Act with
regard to investigatory files was to "clarify congressional intent disapproving certain court
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keep secret inter- or intra-agency memoranda or letters, including
the work product of members of the Commission or attorneys pre-
pared in the course of an inspection of the books and records of any
person regulated by the Commission or any examination or investi-
gation or related litigation conducted by or on behalf of the Com-
mission. Also, the SEC may keep secret investigatory records com-
piled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that production
of such records would interfere with enforcement proceedings. In-
vestigatory records, for this purpose, include all documents, records,
transcripts, correspondence and related memoranda and work
product concerning examinations and other investigations and re-
lated litigation which pertain to or may disclose possible violations
of the securities laws by any person.293
The SEC has advocated that because the securities lawyer has a
duty to existing and future stockholders, and because the continu-
ous disclosure system of the Exchange Act makes any failure by a
public corporation to disclose a material fact a continuing antifraud
violation, the corporation attorney has a duty to reveal violations of
the antifraud provisions to the SEC and public investors. Further,
the attorney-client privilege does not prevent such disclosure.294 As
the Terkeltoub case points out, however, the Commission's efforts
to lay bare every incipient business fraud which comes to the atten-
tion of an attorney would effectively deprive corporations of their
right to counsel. Such government intrusion into attorney-client
communications is evil not only because of its "chilling impact upon
the lawyer's advocacy," but also because of its "invasion of the
lawyer's privacy in preparation." '295 An attorney is entitled to such
interpretations which have tended to expand the scope of agency authority to withhold
certain investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes." 3 United States Code
Congressional and Administrative News, 93d Cong., 2d Seass. 6267 (1974).
'" SEC Securities Act Release No. 5571 (1975). In In re Bader, Freedom of Information
Act Release No. 1 (April 3, 1975), the SEC took the position that it need not release investi-
gatory records on the grounds that law enforcement proceedings were in progress or in the
contemplation of the SEC. It is too early to assess how the SEC will respond to requests under
the new amendments for opening its files. However, the agency's initial reaction has been to
criticize the statute and try to keep secret as much of its files as the law will permit. See 302
BNA Szm. REG. & L. REp. A-12 (May 12, 1975).
2' See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 437, 453-68 (1974).
ns See.United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); accord, In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973).
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privacy whether he is working in his office or in court. The
Commission is not entitled to say that "very little of a securities
lawyer's work is adversary in character""29 and then regulate the
performance of that work, when it is the SEC who is the adversary.
If, as we have suggested, a securities lawyer acts as an advocate
whether he is confronting the SEC's Division of Corporation Fi-
nance or the Division of Enforcement, the attorney's privilege
should not be contingent upon if or when the SEC commences an
investigation or proceeding. The power to stop order, enjoin or re-
voke a license based upon a securities transaction is always present.
The subtlety and gentility of the Commission's rationalization for
inquiring into attorney-client relationships does not make the SEC's
enforcement program free from constitutional infirmity.
To make the work product privilege at least as fully applicable
to the private securities lawyer as it is to the SEC staff lawyer is
particularly important in the context of corporate representation.
This is because the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege are
unclear. In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,217 the attorney-client privilege
was held not to be available in a shareholder derivative suit with
respect to prior communications between management and corpo-
rate counsel. However, if the SEC or U.S. Attorney attempted to
obtain such information, either the attorney-client or work product
privilege should be available.2 18
It should be noted that the unavailability of the privilege against
self-incrimination for corporations does not deprive them of the
attorney-client or work product privileges. Indeed, such privileges
should not be denied to corporations
...because of their power, wealth, or quasi-public position,
since--unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, which
they do not enjoy-it is not intended as a shield to the weak,
but rather as an encouragement to all, strong and weak alike,
to consult freely with counsel.299
29 In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404, [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,407, 83,174-75 n.20 (1973).
2- 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
" See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); Continental Oil Co.
v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964). But see United States v. Koenig [1973-74
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953,
955 (1956).
ATITORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITIES
The loyalty of SEC staff attorneys in seeking to protect the confi-
dentiality of the Commission's files, despite the limited applicabil-
ity to government lawyers of the duty to preserve the confidences
and secrets of a client, is not surprising. As\ was stated in support
of the attorney-client privilege, by a less than ardent defender,
... it must be repugnant to any honorable man to feel that
the confidences that his relation naturally invites are liable at
the opponent's behest to be laid open through his own testi-
mony. He cannot but feel the disagreeable inconsistency of
being at the same time the solicitor and the revealer of the
secrets of the cause. This double-minded attitude would create
an unhealthy moral state in the practitioner. Its concrete im-
propriety could not be overbalanced by the recollection of its
abstract desirability.300
In SEC v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., the court
strongly admonished the SEC for exercising its discretion to with-
hold financial information which might have been material to the
defendant accounting firm:
Unless the SEC's pronouncements of cooperation with public
accountants in the interests of providing full and understanda-
ble disclosure to the investing public are to be taken as mere
exercises in public relations, the SEC must genuinely indicate
that cooperation is indeed a two-way street. Surely the SEC
would not choose to have accountants judge it by the precept
"do as I do, not as I say."30 1
C. Who Represents The Public Interest?
In an adversary system, neither the prosecuting attorney nor the
private practitioner is the sole guardian of the public interest. In an
adversary system, a lawyer must vigorously represent the interests
of his client within the boundaries of the law. Both the lawyer and
his client may realize that their adversary, the SEC, has a statutory
command to direct its efforts in rule-making and adjudication to-
ward the public interest and the protection of investors. However,
the SEC may on occasion see its interest best served by attempting
to increase its jurisdiction by prosecuting novel cases. There is no
8 WIGMoP , EvIDENcE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 94,852 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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good reason why the private lawyer should be enlisted in this effort
when it may be in the best interest of his client and the public to
limit the SEC's jurisdiction.
The relationship of an SEC attorney to the Commission is very
similar to the relationship of the private practitioner to the board
of directors of a public corporation. There is no more reason why a
private practitioner should assume a board of directors is engaging
in illegal conduct than government attorneys should assume that
members of the Commission are engaging in illegal conduct. The
private practitioner, like the government attorney, should be pro-
tected from liability if he acts in good faith and reasonably believes
that his clients are acting lawfully.
A good argument could be made that regulation of the public
securities markets by the SEC has been an abysmal failure because
the federal securities laws did not prevent the I.O.S., Equity
Funding, Penn-Central or other notorious frauds of the late
1960's. The blame for these frauds, however, should be assigned
to avarice and speculation rather than the SEC. But neither should
the blame for these frauds be assigned to the securities bar. It
would be unwise to expect the securities laws to eliminate fraud
for all time because of the national countervailing interest in
expanding the free capital markets. If the SEC and its statutes have
been unable to rid the world of fraud, private practitioners are un-
likely to discover a cure. Moreover, chilling the adversarial nature
of the relationship between private and government attorneys would
be a cure worse than the disease.
Truth should not be achieved at the expense of liberty.
A bar too tightly regulated, too conformist, too "governmen-
tal," is not acceptable to any of us. We speak often of lawyers
as "officers of the court" and as "public" people. Yet our basic
conception of the office is of one essentially private-private
in politico-economic, ideological terms-congruent with a sys-
tem of private ownership, enterprise, competition, however
modified the system has come over time to be. It is not
necessary to recount here the contributions of a legal profession
thus conceived to the creation and maintenance of a relatively
free society. It is necessary to acknowledge those contributions
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and to consider squarely whether (or how much) they are en-
dangered by proposed reforms 02°
The government attorney is a public servant who should be repre-
senting the public interest at all times. The public interest goes
beyond the parochial concerns of a particular agency. As important
as it may be for the SEC to root out fraud, the integrity of the legal
system and personal liberty are more important. An attorney cannot
adequately represent his clients when he is worried about his own
liability. Although an attorney should not be immune from securi-
ties law liability merely by reason of his profession, he should not
be made derivatively liable for the derelictions of his clients.
"I Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal View, 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 14, 34
(1975).

